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THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ANTICANON 
Deborah Pearlstein* 
 
Donald Trump’s presidency has given rise to a raft of concerns not just 
about the wisdom of particular policy decisions but also about the prospect 
that executive actions might have troubling longer term “precedential” 
effects.  While critics tend to leave undefined what “precedent” in this 
context means, existing constitutional structures provide multiple 
mechanisms by which presidential practice can influence future executive 
branch conduct:  judicial actors rely on practice as gloss on constitutional 
meaning, executive branch officials rely on past practice in guiding 
institutional norms of behavior, and elected officials outside the executive 
branch and the people themselves draw on past practice to help evaluate the 
political legitimacy of presidential conduct in the present day.  Yet while the 
prospect of precedential impact exists, it is equally apparent that not every 
executive action ends up having any of these effects.  Quite to the contrary, 
from the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration’s action targeting Japanese-
Americans on the basis of race during World War II, to President Richard 
Nixon’s behavior in the Saturday Night Massacre, one might equally 
hypothesize the existence of an executive branch anticanon of sorts—
executive actions that have produced none of the standard precedential 
effects, save inasmuch as they have served to establish an interpretive or 
normative understanding rejecting such executive behavior.  Identifying how 
certain instances of presidential practice achieve such anticanonical status 
seems today an especially pressing exercise.  In addition to helping refine 
our thinking about the interpretive impact of presidential practice on 
constitutional meaning, establishing how anticanonical status is achieved 
may help clarify the agreed-upon scope of at least some of the norms of 
democratic governance that have proven rich fodder in recent years for 
“constitutional hardball”—that is, resort to practices that are technically 
constitutional but that one might once have thought run afoul of normative 
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principles of governance that could go without saying.  Surfacing the 
existence of anticanonical practice can likewise help guard against the 
prospect that disfavored presidential behaviors might reset default normative 
expectations among government officials and the public, expectations that 
tend to assume because past presidents have taken some action, future 
presidents can defensibly take the same approach.  And tracing 
anticanonical development can help to identify pathways for forestalling 
emergent presidential precedent from developing.  By examining 
anticanonical development through several concrete examples, this Article 
aims to demonstrate how presidential “precedent” is established less by 
presidential action and more by systemic reaction to what presidents do. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Of the many intensely partisan conflicts surrounding the Donald Trump 
presidency, the president’s decision in early 2019 to invoke authority under 
the National Emergencies Act1 to secure funding for a border wall that 
Congress had otherwise declined to support provoked sharp, strikingly 
bipartisan reactions.  Some members of Congress criticized the policy 
wisdom of the wall; others urged that the president’s action was a usurpation 
 
 1.  Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of the U.S.C.). 
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of Congress’s constitutional authority.2  But at least as common a concern 
was that the president’s action would set a negative precedent.  As one 
senator put it:  “If President Trump opens the door to presidents declaring 
fake emergencies to fund spending they can’t persuade the people’s 
representatives in Congress to support, then a dangerous precedent has been 
set . . . .”3  The border wall is hardly the only occasion on which government 
officials have worried about the long-term effects of the current presidency.  
Indeed, concerns about the creation of presidential “precedent” have 
accompanied any number of presidential controversies, from the president’s 
unilateral decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria,4 to his decision to 
pardon Arizona Sheriff Joseph Arpaio,5 and the decision to fire the director 
of the FBI while an investigation into his presidential campaign was 
pending.6 
Describing presidential action as precedent setting should sound at least 
somewhat strange to lawyerly ears.  What presidents do is hardly precedential 
in any traditional, stare decisis sense; neither courts nor Congress nor 
subsequent presidents are by any formal command bound to follow the 
examples of past presidents in making their own policy decisions.  Yet, the 
expression is far from wholly rhetorical.  What presidents do—what past 
presidents have done—can matter a great deal not only in creating legal 
meaning but also in guiding executive branch decision-making day-to-day.  
In purely doctrinal terms, the U.S. Supreme Court has long taken the view 
that “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated 
as a gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the President” by Article II of the 
U.S. Constitution.7  Opinions of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of 
 
 2. Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency, and Provokes a Constitutional 
Clash, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/ 
15/us/politics/national-emergency-trump.html [https://perma.cc/CL4P-7QCQ]. 
 3. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Patty Murray, Senator Murray Denounces Trump’s Plan to 
Bypass Congress and Declare Phony National Emergency, Votes to Keep Government Open 
and Reject President Trump’s Wasteful Wall (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.murray. 
senate.gov/public/index.cfm/mobile/newsreleases?ID=47EF48DE-86A0-43AD-8CBE-
43C1965A0B76 [https://perma.cc/8URP-6QBX]; see also Tim Haines, GOP Sen. Lisa 
Murkowski:  “Dangerous Precedent” to Allow President to Use National Emergency to 




 4. See, e.g., Catie Edmondson, In Bipartisan Rebuke, House Majority Condemns Trump 
for Syria Withdrawal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/10/16/us/politics/house-vote-trump-syria.html [https://perma.cc/J9M3-K2QW]. 
 5. T. J. Raphael, Trump’s Arpaio Pardon Draws Bipartisan Criticism, THE WORLD 
(Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-08-28/trumps-arpaio-pardon-draws-
bipartisan-criticism [https://perma.cc/5EDW-ZL4T]. 
 6. See, e.g., Comey Firing:  Reaction from Members of Congress on FBI Director’s 
Dismissal, WASH. POST (May 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/ 
wp/2017/05/09/comey-firing-reaction-from-members-of-congress-on-fbi-directors-dismissal 
[https://perma.cc/4SH8-QCFK]. 
 7. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)).  State practice is at least 
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Legal Counsel (OLC) invoke particularly expansive versions of this idea 
(with or without evidence that the practice has been broken or repeated) in 
evaluating the legality of contemplated executive action in a range of 
contexts.8  Apart from its role in establishing constitutional meaning, practice 
can also function to establish and maintain norms that guide official decision-
making inside the executive branch.9  And it can help establish norms that 
extend beyond the executive branch, setting expectations against which 
Congress and the public evaluate the legitimacy of presidential conduct more 
broadly.10  Taken together, these varied potential impacts of presidential 
practice can produce a profound effect on present governance. 
Yet those who are most concerned about the impact of the current 
presidency might take some comfort that not all presidential behavior 
becomes influential in practice-perpetuating ways.  Indeed, some historical 
instances of executive conduct are, today, broadly recognized as mistaken, 
unlawful, or simply wrong.  Think of the internment of Japanese-American 
citizens during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration or the Saturday Night 
Massacre during Richard Nixon’s.  Legal scholars have documented an 
anticanon among decisions of the Supreme Court.  At base, the judicial 
anticanon is a set of precedents that, whether or not ever formally overturned, 
are widely recognized among law professors, lawyers, and jurists to no longer 
be good law.11  One might equally hypothesize something of an anticanon of 
executive behavior—that is, historical executive branch conduct that has 
come to be widely recognized as so unacceptable in character that it has not 
produced any of the “precedential” effects just described.  The anticanon of 
executive behavior is executive practice that is not relied on by judicial actors 
as evidence of constitutional meaning; and to the extent the behavior has 
served to establish or maintain norms within or outside the executive branch, 
it does so only insofar as the behavior has come to serve as “positive authority 
for the propositions that [it] reject[s].”12 
Determining how certain executive branch actions achieve anticanonical 
status seems to be of practical utility in the current climate in several respects.  
First, to the extent judicial attention to presidential practice is based on the 
theory that constitutional meaning may be discerned from mutually agreed 
 
equally central to the development of customary international law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 102(2) (AM. L. INST. 1987) (“Customary 
international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them 
from a sense of legal obligation.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Auth. to Use Mil. Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 7, 14 (2011). 
 9. See Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2189–
90 (2018). 
 10. See infra Part I.A. 
 11. See generally Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011) 
(identifying Dred Scott v. Sanford, Plessy v. Ferguson, Lochner v. New York, and Korematsu 
v. United States as constituent members of the judicial anticanon). 
 12. Id. at 384. 
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upon institutional performance over time,13 evidence that the executive 
branch has itself spurned a particular practice seems at least as significant 
evidence of nonagreement as a formal congressional objection to an assertion 
of power or, for that matter, congressional silence.  Moreover, surfacing the 
existence of anticanonical practices may provide a methodology for 
describing with more granularity current norms of democratic governance, 
including those that have proven rich fodder for what Mark Tushnet usefully 
described as “constitutional hardball”:  “claims and practices . . . that are 
without much question within the bounds of existing constitutional doctrine 
and practice but that are nonetheless in some tension with . . . the ‘go without 
saying’ assumptions that underpin working systems of constitutional 
government.”14  From across-the-board invocations of executive privilege 
and claims of an ability to avoid all investigation,15 to reallocation of 
congressionally appropriated funds16—recent practice suggests that at least 
some of what one might have considered “go without saying” assumptions 
may actually need to be said.  Finally, establishing how anticanonical status 
is achieved may help challenge an otherwise default assumption that every 
instance of executive behavior has inevitable precedential effects.  Indeed, if 
presidential “precedent” is not born but made, past routes to anticanonical 
status might serve as a road map for how current institutions can act to guard 
against the prospect that disfavored presidential actions develop such 
precedential effects. 
However useful this exercise may be, the challenges of identifying an 
executive branch anticanon are quite different from the exercise in the 
judicial realm.  The concept of a judicial “canon” is reasonably well 
understood, having been the subject of writings in theory and practice for 
some time.17  If a judicial canon might be defined as a set of Supreme Court 
cases that a particular constituency—say, law professors—agrees is essential 
to accomplishing a particular goal—say, the attainment of professional legal 
competence—then it is easy enough to determine which cases likely belong 
in such a canon.  Very roughly, one might draw a line through those cases 
that most commonly appear in casebooks and scholarly commentary 
assembled for that same purpose.18  If a judicial anticanon is, in one respect, 
made up of cases that are no longer recognized as good law, teachable only 
 
 13. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 426 (2012) (citing EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE 
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (J. G. A. Pocock ed., 1987) (1790)). 
 14. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 & n.2 
(2004). 
 15. See, e.g., Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 2019), vacated, 140 
S. Ct. 2019 (2020); Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Couns. to the President, to Nancy Pelosi, 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Elijah C. Cummings, Chairman of the House Comm. 
on Oversight and Reform, Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, House Foreign Affs. Comm. & Adam B. 
Schiff, Chairman, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intel. (Oct. 8, 2019) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Cipollone Letter]. 
 16. See, e.g., El Paso County v. Trump, 408 F. Supp. 3d 840 (W.D. Tex. 2019). 
 17. See, e.g., J. M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 963, 970 (1998). 
 18. See Greene, supra note 11, at 474. 
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insofar as they serve as examples of bad or rejected decisions, then one can 
look to scholarly work and especially subsequent judicial decisions as key 
evidence relevant to determining whether the cases are cited unfavorably or 
at all.19 
In contrast, it is far from apparent that a “canon” of executive practice 
exists for any purpose.  Executive practice may take any number of forms, 
from formal executive orders, to informal policy decisions or unwritten 
habits.  Some practices address problems prone to recurrence, others address 
unique or at least deeply historically contingent events.20  It is hardly a 
limited set.  Likewise, given the range of ways in which executive action 
might manifest precedential effect, the constituencies that have some say in 
establishing the precedential effect (or not) of any of these executive 
behaviors include not only courts but also executive branch officials and 
those who influence their views, members of Congress, and the public 
alike—all of whom have multiple formal and informal methods to express 
their views about a particular practice but generally no compulsion to do so.  
Of greater concern, while the current Justices have professional, ethical 
obligations to consider what past Justices have held—making judicial 
opinions essential evidence in establishing a past decision’s present 
significance—presidents have no such duty.  Indeed, particularly when it 
comes to executive practices that are generally held in high regard, it may 
well be a feature of such conduct that it most often produces little in the way 
of conscious, collective acknowledgement, or even agreed-upon definition. 
Yet the same features that make an executive branch canon so difficult to 
identify help make the case that an anticanon is more susceptible to 
discovery.  Unlike positive or uncontroversial executive practices, disfavored 
executive actions tend to produce substantial, and often quite detailed, 
records—in reactions by the courts, Congress, official and popular opinion, 
and more.21  Because presidential precedent can have effects on a variety of 
institutional and private actors, one can observe the response to a particular 
practice among a range of constituencies to note evidence of express 
condemnation, which may exist in actions by Congress, the courts, or 
elsewhere.  It is equally possible, and at times just as instructive, to observe 
the failure of those constituencies to rely on the practical example in 
circumstances in which the practice might otherwise seem to bolster their 
case.  Where all relevant constituencies, particularly when represented in 
bipartisan fashion, agree in either condemnation or nonreliance, one might 
be more confident in assessing the practice to be “anticanonical” in nature.  
And because so many constituencies are involved in determining whether a 
presidential practice has any precedential effect, the exercise requires 
observing the actions and reactions of multiple institutional actors that, by 
the nature of constitutional governance, emerge only over time.  Because 
norms themselves develop and change, a practice that sees sustained 
 
 19. See id. 
 20. See infra Part I (discussing presidential precedent). 
 21. See infra Part II.B (noting various reactions to the Iran-Contra affair). 
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rejection may be recognized as more persuasively deserving of anticanonical 
status than one that happened to garner a single adverse (or welcoming) 
response at the time the president acted. 
The first challenge, then, is epistemological in nature:  how do we 
determine which instances of executive behavior the relevant constituencies 
agree are anticanonical?  To answer that question, this Article begins by 
canvassing the general mechanisms by which executive practice may come 
to have precedential effect and then proposes a tentative set of answers for 
which constituencies and by what indicia of recognition a particular practice 
might become anticanonical in nature.  Part II then tests this approach against 
several historical candidates for anticanonical status, both to illustrate how 
one might assess the views of various institutional actors over time and to 
refine the initial criteria for evaluating anticanonical status.  In Part III, this 
Article examines how the analysis of these examples should inform our 
understanding of current questions of constitutional and normative 
interpretation.  Beyond the prospect that such lists of executive actions in 
plain view may better guide courts and executive branch actors in 
understanding the nature of executive power in areas of ongoing conflict, the 
more significant impact of such findings may be in helping contemporary 
institutions understand the effect of their own responses to presidential 
behavior.  While the Madisonian branches may have become accustomed to 
passively accepting the precedential reality of federal judicial decisions, this 
Article’s anticanonical exercise makes clear that the precedential status of 
presidential behavior depends far more on what happens after the president 
acts. 
A final note before beginning.  Because judicial canons and anticanons are, 
at least in scholarly and pedagogical settings, recognized phenomena, it has 
been possible and useful to subject them as identified sets to various meta-
analyses—i.e., what do cases in this canon (or anticanon) have in common?  
Why are they so broadly recognized as essential reading (for good or ill)? 
What underlying sociological or other forces have led to their construction in 
present form?  The notion of an executive branch anticanon as hypothesized 
here is, comparatively speaking, a conceptual newborn.  As a result, the 
questions this Article aims to answer are designed to define, describe and, to 
an extent, justify mapping an executive branch anticanon’s existence.  It aims 
to understand whether and how—even in an era of stark partisan division—
an executive branch anticanon might be established and sustained.  It offers 
only preliminary speculation about why. 
I.  PRESIDENTIAL PRECEDENT AND THE PROSPECT OF CANON 
Past presidential actions—by which I mean official decisions taken by 
written order or otherwise with a direct effect on the conduct of the U.S. 
government—matter in present governance in more ways than one.  In the 
law, the Supreme Court has relied on accounts of executive practice to inform 
604 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
its understanding of constitutional meaning in any number of contexts.22  
Much as the practice of nation-state actors informs the content of customary 
international law over time,23 the Court has recognized that past executive 
practice may lend a customary constitutional gloss on the scope of U.S. 
executive power today.24  At the same time, as a growing number of scholars 
have documented, past practice can be central in the creation of sublegal 
norms of internal executive branch behavior—from preserving prosecutorial 
independence, to naming new cabinet appointees.25  And past practice can 
help shape expectations for Congress and the public beyond the executive 
branch, either in ways that legitimate and reassure (as when presidents cite 
their predecessors’ similar examples to build political support for a 
controversial initiative) or signal cause for alarm (as when critics assail 
executive conduct for actions that are not normal presidential behavior).26  
After sketching these mechanisms through which past practice can influence 
present behavior, this part considers how concepts of canon and anticanon 
might help make sense of which presidential conduct matters. 
A.  Presidential Precedent 
Perhaps the most well-known, if not uncontroversial, use of past executive 
practice is by courts and other official arbiters of legality who look to 
historical practice as evidence of doctrinal meaning.  This section thus begins 
there before turning to more norm-focused effects. 
1.  Law Creation and Interpretation 
The Supreme Court has long relied on executive branch practice to help 
illuminate the meaning of the largely spare provisions of the Constitution’s 
Article II.27  The leading discussion there remains Justice Felix Frankfurter’s 
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer28 (Steel Seizure).29  
Grappling with the question of whether President Harry S. Truman had the 
constitutional authority to seize and operate the nation’s privately owned 
steel mills on the eve of a labor strike—a putative strike Truman maintained 
would threaten the availability of essential weapons and materiel for troops 
already on the front lines in Korea—Justice Frankfurter rejected the 
formalistic notion that the president’s Article II power could be confined to 
inferences from the constitutional text.  As he put it:  “It is an inadmissibly 
narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words 
 
 22. See infra Part I.A. 
 23. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 102(2) (AM. L. 
INST. 1987). 
 24. See infra Part I.A. 
 25. See, e.g., Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 
65 UCLA L. REV. 1430, 1433–34 (2018); Renan, supra note 9, at 2207–15, 2244–47. 
 26. See infra Part I.C. 
 27. See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 13, at 417–24 (canvassing examples of 
cases relying on executive practice). 
 28. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 29. Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon 
them.”30  Rather, Justice Frankfurter maintained that “a systematic, 
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress 
and never before questioned, . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive 
Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”31  As the historical “record 
is barren of instances comparable to the one before us,”32 Justice Frankfurter 
concluded, there was no basis for sustaining Truman’s action. 
The Steel Seizure case was hardly the first to note the relevance of 
historical practice to constitutional interpretation.  Quite to the contrary, the 
historical practices of the political branches featured prominently among the 
methodologies Chief Justice John Marshall embraced in McCulloch v. 
Maryland.33  In Chief Justice Marshall’s conception, the actual practice of 
government “ought to receive a considerable impression,” at least when 
answering “a doubtful question” involving not the “great principles of 
liberty” but rather “the respective powers of those who are equally the 
representatives of the people.”34  Indeed, by the time Justice Frankfurter 
wrote in 1952, the Court had repeatedly relied on practice-based reasoning 
to inform its understanding of executive power on issues ranging from the 
president’s power to subject legislation passed by Congress to the so-called 
pocket veto,35 to the scope of the pardon power,36 to the disposition of public 
lands.37 
But it is Justice Frankfurter’s “practice-plus-acquiescence” formula—
underscoring the interpretive significance not just of a government practice 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 610–11; see also id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“While the Constitution 
diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the 
dispersed powers into a workable government.”). 
 32. Id. at 612 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 33. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 34. Id. at 401; see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (“As James 
Madison wrote, it ‘was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that difficulties and 
differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms & phrases necessarily 
used in such a charter . . . and that it might require a regular course of practice to liquidate & 
settle the meaning of some of them.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Letter to Spencer Roane 
(Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 450 (G. Hunt ed., 1908))). 
 35. See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 688–89 (1929) (“The views which we have 
expressed as to the construction and effect of the constitutional provision . . . are confirmed 
by the practical construction that has been given to it by the Presidents through a long course 
of years, in which Congress has acquiesced.  Long settled and established practice is a 
consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this 
character.”). 
 36. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 118–19 (1925) (holding that the president’s 
pardon power extended to a contempt of court conviction and noting that “long practice under 
the pardoning power and acquiescence in it strongly sustains the construction it is based on”). 
 37. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472–73 (1915) (“[G]overnment 
is a practical affair, intended for practical men . . . .  [O]fficers, lawmakers, and citizens 
naturally adjust themselves to any long-continued action of the Executive Department—on 
the presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often repeated 
as to crystallize into a regular practice.  That presumption is not reasoning in a circle but the 
basis of a wise and quieting rule that in determining the meaning of a statute or the existence 
of a power, weight shall be given to the usage itself . . . .”). 
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as such but of interbranch concordance about a practice—that has survived 
most prominently in modern court decisions, including those recognizing, for 
example, that Article II supports the president’s power to resolve claims 
under settlement agreements with foreign countries without congressional 
engagement38 and that the president’s exclusive power to recognize foreign 
governments foreclosed congressional regulation of passport designations.39  
It is certainly true that the Court and scholars have, over the years, offered 
various reasons why concordance matters—sometimes treating interbranch 
agreement as essential to sustain a departmental judgment of 
constitutionality, or at least functional practicality; on other occasions 
treating congressional inaction as signaling a waiver of institutional 
prerogative; or as giving rise to institutional and public reliance interests 
deserving of the Court’s respect.40  But the existence or absence of a shared 
understanding of effective power has remained the relevant touchstone, even 
when the results of such an inquiry have been, as on more than one occasion, 
to defeat the president’s assertion of power.41 
Such reliance on practice-plus-acquiescence to establish legal meaning is 
equally apparent in the opinions of OLC, perhaps most in OLC opinions 
regarding the president’s power to use force abroad.  As OLC explained, for 
instance, in its 2011 opinion citing examples of past conduct supporting the 
president’s power to launch operations in Libya, absent new congressional 
authorization, “historical practice is an important indication of constitutional 
meaning, because it reflects the two political branches’ practical 
understanding, developed since the founding of the Republic, of their 
respective roles and responsibilities with respect to national defense.”42  With 
respect to the “limited” presidential use of force abroad, the “pattern of 
executive conduct, made under claim of right, extended over many decades 
and engaged in by Presidents of both parties, ‘evidences the existence of 
 
 38. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (recognizing the president’s 
Article II power to enter into an executive agreement suspending certain claims held by 
American companies against the government of Iran as part of a settlement resolving the 1979 
hostage crisis); id. (“Past practice does not, by itself, create power, but ‘long-continued 
practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action] 
had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent . . . .’” (quoting Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. at 
474)). 
 39. See generally Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) (relying 
on practice and acquiescence to establish the president’s exclusive power to decide whether 
to recognize the territory of a foreign country on a U.S. passport). 
 40. For a discussion of the varied theories supporting interpretive use of practice-plus-
acquiescence, see Bradley & Morrison, supra note 13, at 433. 
 41. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2578 (2014) (holding the 
president’s challenged recess appointments invalid); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 
(2008) (“The President’s Memorandum [ordering state courts to give effect to a federal treaty 
obligation] is not supported by a ‘particularly longstanding practice’ of congressional 
acquiescence, but rather is what the United States itself has described as ‘unprecedented 
action.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 29–30, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (Nos. 05-51 & 04-
10566))). 
 42. See Auth. to Use Mil. Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 7 (2011). 
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broad constitutional power.’”43  While scholars continue to debate whether 
OLC’s engagement on this topic has functioned as relatively more 
constraining or enabling of executive action,44 there is no dispute that both 
Republican- and Democratic-produced OLC opinions have relied heavily on 
past practice as evidence of constitutional meaning. 
Because OLC’s view is often the most authoritative available legal 
guidance on presidential power in a variety of contexts, it is worth noting that 
OLC’s reliance on practice has, in many contexts, gone beyond the habitual 
practice-and-acquiescence formula, drawing at times on executive practice 
without reference to congressional acquiescence or, indeed, even in the face 
of congressional nonacquiescence.  OLC has thus repeatedly advanced 
constitutional objections to, for example, attempts by Congress to shape 
diplomatic negotiations or to obtain certain executive branch documents or 
testimony.45  Whether such claims ultimately prove persuasive in court is 
another matter;46 as the D.C. federal district court recently held in rejecting 
the Trump administration’s claim that administration officials enjoyed 
absolute immunity from congressional subpoenas for testimony, “longevity” 
of this view in OLC opinions “alone does not transform an unsupported 
notion into law.”47  At a minimum, OLC’s habit underscores the prospect 
that even isolated instances of conduct can have some significant effect on 
future use. 
 
 43. Id. (quoting Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173, 178 
(1994)) (referencing historical examples of presidential uses of force absent congressional 
authorization in Panama, Bosnia, Haiti, and Yugoslavia). 
 44. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical 
Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1132–35 (2013) (engaging the 
debate about OLC’s role). 
 45. See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 13, at 457–58, 458 n.200 (“[T]his Office 
has ‘repeatedly objected on constitutional grounds to Congressional attempts to mandate the 
time, manner and content of diplomatic negotiations,’ including in the context of potential 
engagement with international fora.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act, 33 Op. 
O.L.C. 1, 8 (2009))); id. at 8–9 (discussing similar executive branch precedents from the 
Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Clinton administrations); see also 
Assertion of Exec. Privilege over Documents Generated in Response to Cong. Investigation 
into Operation Fast and Furious, 36 Op. O.L.C. 1, 2–5 (2012) (analyzing the applicability of 
executive privilege to certain Justice Department documents sought by the House Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reform as part of its investigation into a law enforcement 
operation known as “Fast and Furious”). 
 46. But see Medellin, 552 U.S. at 532 (observing that “the Government has not identified 
a single instance in which the President has attempted (or Congress has acquiesced in) a 
Presidential directive issued to state courts” requiring them to give effect to the judgment of 
the treaty-based International Court of Justice). 
 47. Comm. on Judiciary v. McGahn, 415 F. Supp. 3d 148, 204 (D.D.C. 2019) (noting that 
the first OLC memorandum to assert that aides enjoyed absolute immunity in this context, a 
1971 opinion authored by William Rehnquist, “does not cite to a single case that stands for 
the asserted proposition, and the ten-plus subsequent publicly available statements by OLC 
that DOJ points to in support of this immunity simply reference back to the 1971 
Memorandum”). 
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2.  Internal Norm-Generating Effect 
Apart from the direct role of practice in guiding the formal legal 
interpretation of the president’s constitutional authority, practice has also 
proven central to the establishment and maintenance of often powerful norms 
of conduct inside the executive branch.  Growing concern in recent years 
about the abandonment of constitutional norms by both the executive and 
legislative branches has helped nourish blossoming literature on the topic48 
and has highlighted several illustrative examples of executive branch norms:  
respect for judicial supremacy on constitutional questions,49 pursuit of a 
deliberative decision-making process on questions of domestic and foreign 
policy,50 recognition of basic legislative oversight powers,51 and access for a 
pool of journalists to White House briefings.52  The list of manifestly 
consequential examples likely extends quite a bit longer than this.  While 
scholars use varied terms to capture the phenomenon—norms, customs, 
conventions—the core idea is that there exists a body of common 
understandings, typically lacking formal status as law, that nonetheless has 
the effect of “regulat[ing] the public behavior of actors who wield high-level 
governmental authority, thereby guiding and constraining how these actors 
‘exercise political discretion.’”53 
Here, some further definition is necessary, for the relationship between 
“practice” and “norms” in this context is not always straightforward.  The 
questions, for example, of where norms come from and how they emerge can 
be vexed by the chicken-and-egg problem:  did a particular habit or practice 
give rise to the establishment of a “norm” or did the norm emerge, rather, 
from a shared moral or political belief about the appropriate exercise of 
power that itself gave rise to a repeated pattern of behavior?  This dilemma 
is reflected to an extent in existing definitional variation in the literature of 
norms.  In some conceptions, the existence of practical examples of a 
particular behavior is effectively synonymous with the term “norm,” which 
 
 48. The literature has grown substantially in recent years.  For a small sample, see, for 
example, Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 25, at 1433–34; David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the 
Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2 (2014); Renan, supra note 9; Adrian Vermeule, 
Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1182 (2013); Keith E. 
Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States, 2013 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1847. 
 49. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683 (1974). 
 50. Renan, supra note 9, at 2221–30 (origin of habit). 
 51. See, e.g., Memorandum from Lloyd N. Cutler, Special Couns. to the President, for All 
Executive Department and Agency General Counsels on Congressional Requests to 
Departments and Agencies Protected by Executive Privilege (Sept. 28, 1994), reprinted in 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30240, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL app. b at 97–98 (2020) 
(“In circumstances involving communications relating to investigations of personal 
wrongdoing by government officials, it is our practice not to assert executive privilege, either 
in judicial proceedings or in congressional investigations . . . .”). 
 52. Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 9–10, CNN v. Trump, No 18-cv-
02610 (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2018). 
 53. Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 25, at 1433–34 (quoting Whittington, supra note 48, at 
1860). 
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is defined as little more than “expected behavioral patterns or regularities,” 
full stop.54  In other accounts, lived practice is but one of several methods by 
which a relevant norm might form; as British Commonwealth constitutional 
scholar A. V. Dicey understood it, normative influence can be achieved 
through “conventions, understandings, habits, or practices which, though 
they may regulate the conduct of the several members of the sovereign 
power . . . are not in reality laws at all.”55 
Nevertheless, whether past practice accounts for some or all of the reasons 
why a particular norm comes to exist, there seems to be widespread 
agreement on at least some definitional points of special relevance here.  
First, practice is part and parcel of what makes a norm—either because 
practice contributed to the norm’s development and/or because practice can 
be important evidence that a norm now exists.56  Second, a norm, once in 
existence, becomes an independent justification for continuing to adhere to 
it, all apart from the reasons for its origin in the first place,57 or whether it 
may be formally codified in law in the second.  Explanations for why norms 
have this effect vary.  By one account, “[h]istorical practice is important in 
part because of its potential to reflect collective wisdom generated by the 
judgments of numerous actors over time.”58  Another view holds that 
bureaucracies have a tendency to generate structures that reinforce practical 
inertia.59  But whether because of a shared belief in the value of collective 
wisdom or because of some behavioral characteristic of bureaucracies, a 
norm’s mere existence can provide (in the present context) executive branch 
actors an independent reason to observe it.  Finally, a key part of what 
distinguishes a “norm” from any other form of government behavior is that 
its violation is met with some form of practical (i.e., social, political, 
professional, or bureaucratic) disapproval.60  Even in the absence of formal 
legal sanction, the violation of a norm brings about some negative 
consequences.61  It is in no small measure for this reason that norms can play 
a significant role in shaping executive branch conduct day-to-day. 
 
 54. Renan, supra note 9, at 2197 (citing Richard Fallon, What Are “Norms” and 
“Conventions?” (2018) (unpublished manuscript)); see also Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 25, 
at 1433 (adopting Phillip Pettit’s understanding of norms as “‘regularities of behavior in a 
society’ that do not have the status of law but that, ‘as a matter of shared awareness, most 
members conform to . . . and most are reinforced in this pattern of behavior by that 
expectation’” (quoting PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS:  A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND 
MODEL OF DEMOCRACY 128 (2012))). 
 55. A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION cxli (8th 
ed. 1915). 
 56. See Renan, supra note 9, at 2197. 
 57. Pozen, supra note 48, at 31 (“Like laws, conventions . . . are typically thought to 
provide content-independent reasons for compliance.” (citing Frederick Schauer, Authority 
and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1935–40 (2008))). 
 58. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 13, at 426 (citing EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON 
THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (J. G. A. Pocock ed., 1987) (1790)). 
 59. See Renan, supra note 9, at 2276 (observing that bureaucratic structures grow up 
around the norm and have the effect of reinforcing it). 
 60. Id. at 2198. 
 61. See, e.g., Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 25, at 1439 (citing Vermeule, supra note 48, at 
1182). 
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A final point (for now) about the role of practice in shaping internal 
executive branch norms:  politically appointed executive branch officials 
commonly come to office with existing, even entrenched, expectations about 
the nature and scope of at least some aspects of executive power.  Especially 
in circumstances where the formal law of executive power is obscure or 
unsettled, decision makers’ instincts about what may be done may play an 
outsized role in establishing the scope of reasonable policy debate.  Although 
internal administrative structures, from executive branch legal counsel to, 
ultimately, presidents themselves, can influence and even alter these 
understandings in the context of particular policy decisions,62 it would be 
unsurprising for a policy official who knows that “presidents have done this 
in the past” to assume equally that “presidents can do this,” unless and until 
given credible reasons to think otherwise.  Executive branch officials are, in 
this respect, as susceptible as others to the impact of normative views about 
the presidency that exist outside the executive branch—views that past 
practice has also helped to shape.  This phenomenon is discussed next. 
3.  External Norm-Generating Effect 
A third way in which past practice can help shape the exercise of executive 
power is in its ability to influence external expectations—the views of elected 
officials, the media, voters, and others—about what kind of behavior is 
accepted as normal, legitimate, or even “presidential” when pursued by the 
executive branch.  There can be little doubt that presidents need, and typically 
care deeply about, the views of institutional and political actors outside the 
executive branch.  In purely instrumental terms, congressional support can 
be essential in securing for any president the outcome she seeks.  As Richard 
Neustadt famously put it:  “[The president] may try to lead the system:  he is 
bound to be its clerk.”63  Winning public opinion more broadly has indeed 
become a central goal of the modern presidency, as “[p]residents regularly 
‘go over the heads’ of Congress to the people at large in support of legislation 
and other initiatives.”64  Perhaps most foundationally, support for executive 
action over time helps sustain the legitimacy of the constitutional system.65  
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to delve fully into complex 
 
 62. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT:  THE ACCOUNTABLE 
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012). 
 63. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS 184 
(1990).  Even, perhaps especially, when it comes to presidential war-making initiatives, 
presidents understand that congressional buy-in (whether or not in the form of formal 
legislation) is essential.  As Howell and Pevehouse found, congressional views turn out to 
influence presidential decisions to use force significantly. See WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON C. 
PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER:  CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR 
POWERS (2007); see also DOUGLAS L. KRINER, AFTER THE RUBICON:  CONGRESS, PRESIDENTS, 
AND THE POLITICS OF WAGING WAR (2010) (examining the effect of legislative mechanisms 
for influencing the conduct of war). 
 64. JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 4 (2017). 
 65. Frank I. Michelman, Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?, 8 REV. CONST. 
STUD. 101, 105 (2003) (“Legitimacy (where it exists) descends to specific legal acts from the 
‘respect-worthiness’ . . . [of the] system, or practice, or ‘regime’ of government.”). 
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questions of political legitimacy in its varied forms,66 it should seem 
uncontroversial to suggest that conduct by a democratic institution perceived 
as illegitimate by a popular majority faces an uncertain future at best.  At a 
minimum, this literature helps illustrate why a political actor interested in 
securing popular support might be interested in assuring the public that 
actions are not only justified but “appropriate” assertions of power.67 
Given such imperatives, it should be unsurprising to find that presidents 
have regularly invoked past executive practice in helping to advance 
initiatives these constituencies might perceive as abnormal.  In much the 
same way that judges traditionally rely on past case authority as an 
independent justification for a decision, independent of whether they actually 
agreed with the outcome in the original case,68 presidents commonly invoke 
prior executive practice to provide public reassurance and secure support for 
present action—not only among members of Congress and the public but also 
among elite thinkers and writers who tend to shape reputational assessments.  
Defending his resort to emergency authority to support the construction of 
his border wall, President Trump thus, uncharacteristically, invoked 
President Barack Obama’s use of the same statutory authority (albeit for 
different purposes) in support of his controversial assertion of power at the 
border.69  Likewise, President Obama publicly defended his decision to defer 
adverse immigration action against individuals brought to the United States 
as children, in part, on similar grounds:  “The actions I’m taking are not only 
lawful, they’re the kinds of actions taken by every single Republican 
President and every single Democratic President for the past half century.”70  
 
 66. For a useful conceptual map distinguishing sociological, moral, and legal forms of 
legitimacy, see RICHARD H. FALLON JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 20–41 
(2018). 
 67. See Richard H. Fallon Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 
1795 (2005) (“[D]efining legitimacy by reference to ‘a conception of obligation to obey any 
commands an authority issues so long as that authority is acting within appropriate limits.’” 
(quoting TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 26 (1990))). 
 68. See generally Schauer, supra note 57. 
 69. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, Trump’s National Emergency Press Conference, Annotated, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/02/15/trumps-
bewildering-national-emergency-press-conference-annotated [https://perma.cc/9FHH-CE5N] 
(“[W]e’re going to be signing, today—and registering—national emergency.  And it’s a great 
thing to do, because we have an invasion of drugs, invasion of gangs, invasion of people and 
it’s unacceptable.  And by signing the national emergency, something signed many times by 
other presidents, many, many times—President Obama, in fact, we may be using one of the 
national emergencies that he signed having to do with cartels, criminal cartels.  It’s a very 
good emergency that he signed . . . .”); see also Gregory Korte, Trump Defends Arpaio 
Pardon; Lists Other Infamous Uses of the Power, USA TODAY (Aug. 28, 2017, 10:12 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/08/28/trump-defends-arpaio-pardon-
lists-other-infamous-uses-power/609317001 [https://perma.cc/PF7L-F9K2]; Remarks by 
President Trump and President Niinistö of Finland in Joint Press Conference, THE WHITE 
HOUSE (Aug. 28, 2017, 4:20 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
president-trump-president-niinisto-finland-joint-press-conference [https://perma.cc/2SCJ-
9N8N]. 
 70. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration, WHITE HOUSE 
(Nov. 20, 2014, 8:01 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/ 
20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration [https://perma.cc/3U6L-78XX]. 
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Without conducting a full survey of modern presidential oratory, even 
cursory searches reveal that reliance on past practice as a tool of presidential 
rhetorical persuasion abounds.71 
The converse effect is likewise much in evidence, as critics of particular 
executive actions regularly invoke, among its worst qualities, the action’s 
“unprecedented” nature.  Using the term “unprecedented” with reference to 
one or more aspects of the Trump administration’s conduct is pervasive, from 
references to the president’s firing of Director of the FBI James Comey and 
the administration’s categorical refusal to comply with congressional 
subpoenas, to the president’s business-related conflicts of interest and use of 
Twitter as a method of communication.72  Yet the “unprecedented” critique 
is in fact a perennial chestnut of presidential criticism, as opponents of 
executive branch action have strived to weaken public support for particular 
actions.73  Just as norms, once established, become independent reasons for 
their own continuation within a bureaucracy, the normal or abnormal nature 
of presidential conduct—as evinced by the presence or absence of past 
practice—remains a powerful, or at least common, ground for influencing 
 
 71. Among further examples, see February 4, 1997:  State of the Union Address, MILLER 
CTR. (Feb. 4, 1997), https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/february-4-
1997-state-union-address [https://perma.cc/L3QQ-68HA] (“Almost exactly 50 years ago, in 
the first winter of the Cold War, President Truman stood before a Republican Congress and 
called upon our country to meet its responsibilities of leadership . . . .  That Congress, led by 
Republicans like Senator Arthur Vandenberg, answered President Truman’s call.  Together, 
they made the commitments that strengthened our country for 50 years.  Now let us do the 
same.”); Transcript of President’s Address on Nuclear Strategy Toward Soviet Union, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 23, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/23/world/transcript-of-president-
s-address-on-nuclear-strategy-toward-soviet-union.html [https://perma.cc/4H2N-D6FS] 
(“We must replace and modernize our forces, and that’s why I’ve decided to proceed with the 
production and deployment of the new ICBM known as the MX.  Three earlier Presidents 
worked to develop this missile.”). 
 72. Matthew Ingram, The 140-Character President, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Fall 
2017), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/trump-twitter-tweets-president.php [https:// 
perma.cc/BS5F-F2HB] (“The president’s use of a public platform like Twitter to talk directly 
with the American people is unprecedented for the presidency . . . .”); Kerry W. Kircher, 
Trump’s Unprecedented Fight to Withhold Information, ATLANTIC (Aug. 27, 2019), https:// 
www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/house-needs-its-subpoena-power-against-
trump/596857 [https://perma.cc/S4FZ-XMVP] (“The Trump administration—as it has in so 
many other dangerous ways—again has set itself apart, this time in the unprecedented degree 
to which it has resisted congressional oversight.  In the space of just a few months, Trump has 
declared war on the House’s investigation of the executive branch . . . .”); Richard C. Paddock 
et al., Potential Conflicts Around the Globe for Trump, the Businessman President, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/26/us/politics/donald-trump-
international-business.html [https://perma.cc/6WUF-WQNB]; White House Announced 
Firing of James Comey, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2017/05/09/us/politics/document-White-House-Fires-James-Comey.html [https://perma.cc/ 
XG25-VNKX]. 
 73. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, LAWLESS:  THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S 
UNPRECEDENTED ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2015); Andy 
Worthington, George W. Bush’s Torture Program Began Ten Years Ago, ANDY 
WORTHINGTON (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2012/02/14/george-w-
bushs-torture-program-began-ten-years-ago/ [https://perma.cc/EWW5-M4PB] (“Depriving 
prisoners seized in wartime of the protections of the Geneva Conventions was a huge and 
unprecedented step, and thoroughly alarming.”). 
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the views of Congress and the public more broadly.  The expectation that 
past practice can play such a significant and persuasive role in securing 
popular or political approval for present action means that much depends not 
only on the strength of the claim that a particular past action actually occurred 
as described but also on the conviction that current perceptions of the past 
action remain favorable or neutral enough to still be well received. 
B.  Practical Canons and Anticanons 
Why and how might the task of canonical collection help shed light on 
how presidential practice informs the conduct of government today?  It may 
help to consider, by way of definition, a canonical context law professors 
know well—canons of judicial opinions, collected for various purposes.74  
Constitutional law casebooks, for example, feature a core set of cases year 
after year, the cases “law professors and casebooks recognize as minimally 
necessary for students to attain professional competence in constitutional 
law,” the “set of decisions whose correctness participants in constitutional 
argument must always assume.”75  While there is ample disagreement around 
some parts of what students of constitutional law must learn, the canon can 
be said to comprise at least an agreed-upon core of opinions collected for that 
purpose.  To be sure, promoting the attainment of professional competence 
is but one of any number of purposes around which one might identify a 
constitutional canon.  Variant canons of judicial opinions might be thought 
“necessary [to ensure] cultural literacy for citizens in a democracy” or to 
“serve as benchmarks for testing academic theories about the law.”76  For 
present purposes, it may suffice to note that what distinguishes a canon in 
this sense from any old list is not the purpose for which the materials are 
collected but rather that constituents relevant to the purpose of the list agree 
that the content of the list is so.  One set of cases is canonical for pedagogical 
purposes because lawyers, judges, and professors agree that they are so.  A 
potentially different set of cases is canonical for theoretical study because 
scholars agree that they are so. 
Identifying canons of any kind among executive branch “precedents” 
presents a somewhat different problem.  For better or worse, there is no 
professional school for presidents and accordingly no canon of presidential 
practice for presidency training purposes.  Presidential practice unmistakably 
matters in other ways, but the precedential effects identified in the preceding 
section require for their achievement the engagement of a range of 
constituencies.  To understand whether a particular practice has had 
interpretive effect on constitutional meaning, one could look in the first 
instance to the Supreme Court—if the Court has noted a practice as evidence 
of meaning, then surely it would count as one indicator in favor of finding 
that practice useful in that sense.  To understand whether the practice has 
helped to form an internal executive branch norm, one can look to executive 
 
 74. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 17, at 970; Greene, supra note 11, at 474. 
 75. Greene, supra note 11, at 381. 
 76. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 17, at 969. 
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branch memoranda, statements, and subsequent executive branch conduct for 
evidence of collective agreement.  Finding a practice repeated over time, 
across both Republican and Democratic administrations, seems a strong 
indicator of norm-creating or norm-sustaining status.  Finally, to understand 
whether a practice has had any common normative impact on public 
expectations, one might look to subsequent legislative responses, public 
polling data, and other indicia of popular political opinion.  Practices greeted 
with widespread, consistent favor (or at the very least, noncontroversy) 
among these groups over time seem good candidates for establishing such an 
effect. 
Yet while agreement about precedential effect (or canonical status) might 
be discerned from a variety of formal and informal actions that all of these 
institutions and actors are capable of taking—judicial opinions, legislation, 
public statements, and more—it must be noted that existing structures give 
these actors, at best, sharply limited incentives to express a judgment about 
canonical presidential behavior in any regular way.  The courts’ jurisdiction 
is limited to cases and controversies, and canonical practice seems, by its 
nature, unlikely to have generated much of either.77  Likewise, while current 
justices have professional, ethical obligations to care about what past justices 
have held, a current president has no such duty.  The absence of citation or 
reference to past presidential conduct in records of present decision-making 
might be notable in some circumstances, but given the vastness of the body 
of actions on which to rely, a president’s decision to cite or even replicate a 
past president’s behavior seems not especially persuasive evidence of 
anything other than the proposition that presidents sometimes do and 
sometimes do not use examples of past practice to support the achievement 
of their current ends.  Indeed, it may well be a feature of good executive 
branch conduct, however regularly repeated or praiseworthy, that it most 
often produces little in the way of conscious, collective acknowledgement, 
or even agreed-upon definition, in either political branch.  And even well-
known presidential actions, however widely praised, may be so tied to unique 
circumstances as to have, at best, uncertain effect on present governance.  
What normative insight may current governing institutions draw from, say, 
President Abraham Lincoln’s proclamation freeing enslaved peoples?  A 
norm about racial equality?  Or one about presidential power? 
Disfavored executive actions, by contrast, tend to produce substantial, and 
often quite detailed, records—in reactions by the courts, Congress, official 
and popular opinion, and more.  Instances of executive practice that have 
been formally condemned by all of these constituencies produce records that 
might give us more confidence in concluding that there exists general and 
shared recognition that such a practice satisfies our criteria for anticanonical 
status—that is, presidential conduct so unacceptable that no court would look 
to such an action as evidence of constitutional meaning, and no political 
institution or constituency would look to that practice for any norm of official 
 
 77. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
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conduct other than the opposite of what the practice reflects.78  Whether or 
not a canonical set of presidential practices can be identified, well-known 
acts that have suffered such formal institutional condemnation—in the form 
of, say, a negative decision on the matter by the Supreme Court and 
legislation codifying a contrary rule by Congress—might at least yield a list 
of practices reliably and broadly recognized as anticanonical in effect. 
But however valuable formal institutional condemnation might be in 
identifying candidates for anticanonical practice, it is not altogether clear that 
such evidence should be required to establish a practice’s anticanonical 
status.  Consider, for example, the executive practice challenged in 
Korematsu v. United States,79 a case that has surely earned its place among 
anticanonical Supreme Court decisions, at least in the “not law” sense.  
Whether measuring by negative references in scholarly articles, 
constitutional law casebooks, testimony in judicial confirmation hearings, or 
negative references in subsequent cases and legislation directly,80 the Court’s 
1944 decision had settled comfortably among the “haunted houses of 
constitutional law,”81 even before the Court formally—and finally—
repudiated it in 2018.82 
Just as it had become clear that Korematsu was a dead letter long before it 
was formally overturned, one might also imagine that President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s executive order83 authorizing the military to affect the mass 
exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast was equally no longer 
good practice on which to rely—either as evidence of constitutional meaning 
or as contributing to some positive internal or external norm of presidential 
conduct.  On brief inspection, the proposition seems at least plausible.  
Notwithstanding the President George W. Bush administration’s evident 
interest in a wide-ranging counterterrorism detention program beginning in 
2001, neither Justice Department litigators nor OLC lawyers invoked 
Roosevelt’s practical example in support of their otherwise extraordinarily 
broad claims of Article II power in that era.84  Even as the George W. Bush 
administration relied liberally on other examples of presidential practice in 
its OLC opinions and briefs, the example of that particular action of the 
Roosevelt administration was never cited.85  President George W. Bush did 
 
 78. See infra Part II (evaluating potential examples of such practices). 
 79. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 80. Greene, supra note 11, at 388–402 (detailing popular, political, and formal 
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the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—‘has no 
place in law under the Constitution.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248 
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 83. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938–1942). 
 84. Greene, supra note 11, at 400–02. 
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detention and military trials after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the order aimed at those 
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not invoke the example in defending his own detention practices in public 
speeches.  And while the administration made extensive use of existing 
criminal and immigration statutes to detain hundreds of individuals amidst 
daily fears of additional domestic attacks,86 even detaining a handful of 
American citizens as “enemy combatants,”87 it stopped short of adopting the 
Roosevelt approach—deploying the military to affect the wholesale 
exclusion of a class of individuals from their homes.  Why? 
It is tempting to assume that no such action could have been contemplated 
since the law had changed in other important respects by 2001.  That is, one 
might assume the president did not have the military conduct mass sweeps 
of, say, Saudi-, Afghan-, or even Muslim-American nationals from New 
York or other putatively threatened cities because Congress had long since 
passed, in express rejection of Roosevelt’s Korematsu order, the Non-
Detention Act of 197188 (NDA), proscribing the detention of U.S. citizens 
except by an act of Congress.  Yet the administration was certainly aware—
indeed, the Supreme Court itself had agreed as much by 2004—that the 
statutory Authorization for Use of Military Force89 (AUMF) Congress had 
enacted in the days after September 11, 2001, qualified as an act of Congress 
to satisfy the NDA’s requirement.90  Thus, the statute alone does not explain 
neglect of the Roosevelt administration’s past practice. 
It is also possible that policymakers inside the George W. Bush 
administration concluded that such a practice would simply not be helpful in 
advancing their counterterrorism policy goals.  There are indeed plenty of 
security policy reasons to conclude that the exclusion and internment of 
Japanese-Americans on the West Coast was a time-wasting diversion of 
military resources and personnel that could have been far more effectively 
used elsewhere.  Yet in addition to the “enemy combatant” detentions of a 
handful of American citizens in the United States, the administration had 
pursued significant (if on a smaller scale than Korematsu) counterterrorism 
detention operations against noncitizens during that time period, operations 
aimed overwhelmingly at men from predominantly Muslim countries.91  It 
thus seems hard to argue that the administration thought large, class-based 
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detention operations would be categorically unlikely to help their 
counterterrorism initiatives. 
An alternative possibility is thus at least worth considering—namely, that 
the administration believed that invocation or repetition of President 
Roosevelt’s practical example would neither advance their claims legally, 
nor aid their cause politically.  The mass exclusion and detention of a race-
or religion-based class of U.S. citizens could not persuasively be invoked as 
a gloss on the meaning of the president’s power under Article II; and it set 
no favorable marker likely to enhance public perceptions of the wisdom, 
legitimacy, or even presidentialness of any executive action going forward.  
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s formal judicial validation of 
Roosevelt’s exclusion order in Korematsu, neither relying on nor replicating 
Roosevelt’s practice would be likely to secure the president any advantage.  
Put differently, it is possible members of the Bush administration, for these 
or other reasons, viewed the Japanese-American internment example as 
anticanonical in nature—that is, an example of past practice so generally 
recognized as mistaken that it is has come to set a standard for what the 
executive branch should not do. 
As straightforward as it might seem, selecting the Japanese-American 
exclusion example as Exhibit A in a hypothetical catalog of anticanonical 
practices also underscores the complexity of defining such a practice set.  
Among other things, real-time condemnation of the particular practice as 
such may be too much—and the wrong thing—to ask.  After all, the 
putatively anticanonical practice of Japanese-American exclusion was 
initially welcomed with broad popular support,92 congressional inaction, and 
(in critical part) formal judicial validation.93  The following decades did 
eventually produce general legislation aimed at preventing the future 
detention of Americans without an act of Congress94 and, forty years later, a 
writ of coram nobis for Fred Korematsu in particular.95  But might it not have 
been possible that the practice had achieved anticanonical status—such that 
no court would affirmatively rely on it and no executive would embrace it—
even before the courts formally acknowledged error?  Indeed, it seems 
plausible to imagine anticanonical status quite commonly emerging 
iteratively over time or at least over a longer period of time than allowed by 
the window in which formal institutional invalidation (because of mootness 
or analogous constraints) was possible to achieve. 
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internment.aspx [https://perma.cc/AEP6-GQQN]; Paul Thornton, Opinion, In 1942, We 
Favored Japanese Internment.  Shame on Us, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www. 
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Given the Court’s regular reliance on presidential practice (and legislative 
acquiescence) in assessing the constitutionality of executive action, it is 
certainly sensible to begin by consulting what, if anything, courts have said 
about a particular practice and what, if anything, Congress has done in 
response.  But at least as an initial position, our evaluation of candidates for 
inclusion in an executive branch anticanon should consider not only actions 
that one or the other branches of government has rejected through traditional, 
formal means (i.e., enacted laws and decided cases) but also actions that have 
been treated negatively by the courts, the political branches, and the public 
as evidenced in other ways.  Examples may include congressional hearings, 
opinions of executive branch legal counsel, the statements of executive 
branch policymakers and their elite contemporaries in practice and academe, 
subsequent patterns of use, and iterative exchanges among all of these actors 
not just in reliance on the example but in nonreliance where institutional 
conventions might otherwise expect to produce it. 
That decision, too, carries complex consequences.  For it is almost 
inconceivable that, looking across such a wide range of sources over such an 
extended period of time, one would not encounter some indication that at 
least someone in these circles, perhaps depending on partisan affiliation, still 
views the practice as acceptable or at least not so unacceptable as to be 
beyond contemplation—or even so attractive as to be worth repeating in 
some form.  Indeed, during Donald Trump’s campaign for the presidency, he 
famously called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the 
United States,” later defending his proposal in a televised interview by noting 
that President Roosevelt “did the same thing,” referencing the internment of 
Japanese-Americans.96  Does the favorable mention of the putatively 
anticanonical incident—followed by an attempt to implement a version of 
the policy the incident was invoked to defend—suffice to take the Korematsu 
practice out of the running for anticanonical status?  Or, might the 
anticanonical status of a presidential practice survive its occasional 
invocation?  Might formal action by a handful of official institutions or a 
majority of scholars suffice to establish anticanonical status, or should 
evidence of bipartisan condemnation be required?  How much and what kind 
of rejection of the practice one might conclude suffices to preserve a practice 
as anticanonical in such circumstances may need to await consideration of 
specific examples.  For if the age of constitutional hardball97 has 
demonstrated anything, it is that assumptions about which norms are beyond 
contestation is perhaps narrower than one might have imagined. 
Finally, for present purposes, one might narrow the range of possible 
candidates further by focusing on executive actions that have any chance of 
producing any of the precedential effects described:  actions that might shape 
constitutional meaning, create norms of conduct inside the executive branch, 
 
 96. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2435 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing 
President Trump’s televised remarks). 
 97. See generally Tushnet, supra note 14. 
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or help define the terms of legitimate presidential conduct outside it.98  One 
might likewise select examples only from executive actions well or widely 
enough known to have produced not only a documented internal response 
(such that might evince an internal executive branch norm) but also have 
served as a normative touchstone one way or another in the public mind.  And 
given the prospect that anticanonical status may develop over time, the 
inquiry can also limit the focus to actions that happened long enough ago to 
see how various institutions have responded.  In this respect, inquiring minds 
might prefer actions based on decisions that were bound to recur and indeed, 
that have recurred in more than one administration—the kind of actions for 
which it might be possible for a pattern of behavior over time to emerge. 
II.  EVALUATING CANDIDATES FOR AN EXECUTIVE BRANCH ANTICANON 
Unlike judicial canons and anticanons, the absence of a singular collection 
of presidential actions assembled for the purpose of, for example, 
professional training, means the inquiry necessarily starts from a blanker 
slate; this inquiry cannot be exhaustive but merely illustrative.  The idea here 
is to test the criteria just sketched by offering a set of incidents for 
consideration—some that seem near certain candidates for inclusion in an 
executive branch anticanon, some less certain—in the hope that one might 
better define not just where to look but how to identify anticanonical practice.  
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the examples that follow are taken 
from incidents that are both broadly ill regarded today and in broad contours 
historically well-known; they involve the kinds of decisions that could have 
constitutional implications bound to recur and indeed, that have recurred in 
more than one presidency; and they are limited to modern actions (to 
maximize the likelihood of contemporary relevance) but that are at least 
twenty-five-years old so that subsequent use over time can be observed.  The 
illustrative actions assessed here—involving the handling of investigations 
into the president, the sharing of information with Congress, and the decision 
to use force—meet each of these criteria.  They also help define our inquiry 
further before we turn to consider what anticanonical practice might tell us 
about the current contingencies of executive power. 
A.  Terminating an Investigation into the President 
Among potential candidates for anticanonical practice, President Richard 
Nixon’s decision in October 1973 to fire Watergate special prosecutor 
Archibald Cox seems reasonably low-hanging fruit.  After promising the 
House Judiciary Committee in confirmation hearings that he would appoint 
a special prosecutor to investigate the Watergate matter, newly appointed 
Attorney General Elliot Richardson selected Cox for the post in May 1973.  
With Nixon’s former attorney general, John Mitchell, and others, already 
facing charges of perjury and obstruction of justice in federal court in 
 
 98. It is surely only a small subset of everything presidents have done that has even 
arguable constitutional significance. 
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Washington, D.C., Cox filed and won a motion in the trial court for a 
subpoena compelling the president to turn over newly discovered White 
House audio tapes thought relevant to the ongoing proceedings.  After Cox 
refused White House attempts to offer compromise transcripts of the tapes 
instead, the president ordered Richardson to fire Cox.  When both Richardson 
and his Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus, refused the 
president’s order and resigned, it fell to Solicitor General Robert Bork to 
carry out the president’s command.99 
While questions surrounding the scope of the president’s removal power, 
and the constitutionality of independent counsel, have arisen in the courts 
repeatedly in the decades since, there is no evidence that Nixon’s actions in 
this episode have influenced constitutional meaning in this realm, except 
arguably to support measures to restrict executive authority.  The direct 
constitutionality of the president’s actions that night was never seriously 
contested.  Among the few public officials who spoke immediately in defense 
of Nixon’s conduct, several emphasized that the president surely had 
authority to fire his subordinates at the Justice Department.100  While 
subsequently adopted regulations imposed important limits on the president’s 
ability to remove Cox’s successor special counsel,101 the Supreme Court had 
no occasion to address the converse question—whether Congress could 
constitutionally limit the president’s authority to remove an independent 
counsel engaged in investigating the president—until 1988, when the post-
Watergate independent counsel statute, passed as part of the Ethics in 
Government Act of 1978,102 came before it in Morrison v. Olson.103  Enacted 
a decade earlier, the statute provided that an independent counsel could only 
be removed from office by impeachment or by “the personal action of the 
Attorney General,” and then “only for good cause, physical or mental 
disability,” “or any other condition that substantially impairs” the 
independent counsel’s performance.104  The Morrison Court upheld the 
statute as not unduly interfering with the separation of powers or the 
president’s power under Article II.105 
 
 99. For detailed historical accounts, see, for example, FRED EMERY, WATERGATE:  THE 
CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON (1994); BOB 
WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS:  THE CLASSIC, BEHIND-THE-SCENES 
ACCOUNT OF RICHARD NIXON’S DRAMATIC LAST DAYS IN THE WHITE HOUSE (1976). 
 100. See, e.g., Jules Witcover, Pressure for Impeachment Mounting, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 
1973), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pressure-for-impeachment-mounting/2012/ 
06/04/gJQAd9f6IV_story.html?utm_term=.91a1320cb755 [https://perma.cc/KL97-6ZUE] 
(quoting, among others, Kansas Republican Senator Bob Dole, as saying, “I don’t know what 
other choice the President had . . . .  [i]t’s a question of who’s the President—Nixon or Cox”). 
 101. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694–95 (1974) (citing 38 Fed. Reg. 30,739 
(Nov. 7, 1973), amended by 38 Fed. Reg. 32,805 (Nov. 19, 1973)). 
 102. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 103. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 104. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1). 
 105. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696–97. 
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Yet while the Court’s conclusion met with vigorous dissent at the time106 
and scholarly criticism since,107 perhaps most striking about the Morrison 
opinions is what they do not do.  Neither the majority nor the dissent even 
attempt to leverage past presidential practice to illuminate the much-
contested constitutional meaning (here, the putatively exclusive nature of the 
executive’s control over prosecutors, even special counsel, in the Justice 
Department).  Notwithstanding the majority’s direct reference to Steel 
Seizure,108 not even the dissent noted that, as a matter of historical practice, 
presidents have acted to remove even “independent” counsels more than 
once.109  At least one of those occasions—Nixon’s, just fifteen years 
earlier—involved a presidential removal seemingly contrary to the 
requirements of then applicable Justice Department regulations, enacted 
pursuant to statute.110  To the extent the event played any role in the Justices’ 
thinking, it at most supported the opposite result.111 
It is hard to imagine that the Court’s inattention to presidential practice in 
this realm was merely an oversight.  From the moment it became public, 
President Nixon’s decision to order Cox’s dismissal was radically 
unpopular.112  Gallup conducted a public poll on the question of whether the 
president should be impeached and tracked a notable uptick in support for 
impeachment after the events of the Saturday Night Massacre.113  The 
Washington Post reported the following day that demands for impeachment 
among members of both parties in Congress were mounting swiftly, with 
even Republican leaders describing the president’s action as having 
“precipitated a constitutional crisis.”114  Within days of the Saturday events, 
 
 106. Id. at 697–734 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 107. See, e.g., Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. 
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example, President Ulysses S. Grant’s action removing his previously appointed special 
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 111. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677 (“Congress, of course, was concerned when it created 
the office of independent counsel with the conflicts of interest that could arise in situations 
when the Executive Branch is called upon to investigate its own high-ranking officers.”). 
 112. See, e.g., KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX:  CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 361–62 (1997) 
(describing a “firestorm” of public opinion in response to what was soon called the “Saturday 
Night Massacre”). 
 113. Lydia Saad, Gallup Vault:  More Said ‘Fire Nixon’ After Nixon Fired Cox, GALLUP 
(Jan. 26, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/vault/226370/gallup-vault-fire-nixon-nixon-fired-
cox.aspx [https://perma.cc/3TS6-5FMM]. 
 114. Witcover, supra note 100 (quoting Illinois Republican John B. Anderson, Chair of the 
House Republican Conference). 
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multiple members of Congress introduced resolutions calling, variously, for 
impeachment, investigation, and the appointment of a new Watergate special 
prosecutor.115  Just over a week later, the House Judiciary Committee voted 
to begin issuing subpoenas, a first step toward impeachment.116  Two of the 
three articles of impeachment eventually adopted by the House Judiciary 
Committee the following summer cite the president’s interference with “the 
office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force” as among the grounds for 
impeachment.117  At the same time, Congress opened discussions on the 
prospect of legislation to establish a regular independent prosecutor shortly 
after Cox’s firing.  Those discussions produced extensive hearings and 
ultimately, the passage of the Ethics in Government Act,118 creating the 
office of “independent counsel” to investigate high-ranking government 
officials alleged to have violated federal criminal law.  Under the law the 
Supreme Court eventually upheld in Morrison, the independent counsel 
could only be removed from office by impeachment or by “the personal 
action of the Attorney General,” and then “only for good cause, physical or 
mental disability,” “or any other condition that substantially impairs” the 
independent counsel’s performance.119 
But perhaps the strongest evidence in favor of recognizing Cox’s firing as 
anticanonical practice is the subsequent behavior of the executive branch 
itself.  Despite multiple investigations launched under the authority of the 
independent counsel statute and subsequent Justice Department regulations, 
no president since Nixon has fired an independent counsel appointed to 
investigate his conduct.  Indeed, notwithstanding sweeping and highly 
controversial investigations into both President Ronald Reagan (by Lawrence 
Walsh operating under the Ethics in Government Act) and President Bill 
Clinton (by Ken Starr, operating under the same authority),120 neither Walsh 
nor Starr gave any indication in their lengthy final reports of any executive 
branch attempt to terminate their investigations.121  The recently concluded 
investigation of President Trump and the Trump campaign by Special 
Counsel Robert Mueller is in this respect dramatically different.122  The 
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Mueller report details multiple attempts by the president, calling on more 
than a half dozen different individuals both in and out of government, to 
terminate the Mueller investigation.123  Yet in recounting the response to the 
president’s demands of multiple executive branch officials, including the 
president’s handpicked attorney general and White House counsel, the 
Mueller report usefully illuminates prevailing executive branch 
understandings of the Nixon example.  Beyond officials’ consistent refusals 
to comply with the president’s demands,124 it seems clear the Nixon events 
served as an influential, negative example.  As former White House Counsel 
Donald McGahn later told investigators, he did not want to be like “Saturday 
Night Massacre Bork.”125 
Such statements, coupled with Trump administration officials’ uniform 
and repeated refusal to comply with the president’s demands, make for 
particularly compelling evidence that Nixon’s conduct has come to serve as 
“positive authority for the propositions [it] reject[s].”126  All lines of evidence 
available to us support this conclusion.  Despite opportunities, no court has 
ever cited Nixon’s example (or that of, say, President Ulysses S. Grant) as 
evidence that Congress’s ability to regulate independent counsel is 
constitutionally limited.  Public and official indicia suggest Nixon’s actions 
have been widely and consistently rejected by both Congress and the public.  
And executive branch officials themselves have either viewed it as 
counterproductive, impossible, or out of the question for any subsequent 
president to follow Nixon’s course.  That is, Nixon’s action has come to stand 
for a norm supporting the opposite of the practice he pursued:  the president 
should not be able to terminate an investigation into his own potentially 
illegal activity by unilaterally removing investigative counsel. 
If this example is persuasive, one might take some reassurance about the 
accuracy of the preliminary assumptions above.  That is, negative, even 
profoundly negative, conduct by the president need not be formally rejected 
by a court to be broadly recognized as such, but judicial or other official 
nonreliance on the practice in the face of opportunities to do so can be 
important evidence of anticanonical status.  Negative presidential practice 
can indeed be expected to produce a substantial record of consistent, 
bipartisan condemnation in some form over time, though subsequent 
examples below may help to illuminate how consistent this condemnation 
need be.  Finally, the nonrepetition of the practice across bipartisan 
administrations and, perhaps more significant, the anticipation of adverse 
 
 123. 2 id. at 90–105. 
 124. Id. at 85. 
 125. Id. at 85–86; see also Questionnaire for Non-judicial Nominees, U.S. SENATE COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY (June 29, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 
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of justice, for which he may be criminally prosecuted upon leaving office. See 2 MUELLER III, 
supra note 122, at 92–95. 
 126. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
624 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
professional or reputational consequences in the event of repetition (as 
evinced in the McGahn testimony), seems to satisfy common definitions of 
how norms function.127  Notwithstanding countervailing pressures (including 
even presidential direction), norms can certainly exert an independent pull 
on current governing decisions—and anticanonical norms can be expected to 
exert an especially strong one. 
B.  Concealing Use-of-Force Operations from Congress 
If the Saturday Night Massacre might serve for present purposes as a 
paradigmatic example of anticanonical practice, many other examples of 
presidential practice come with records that are more complex, even within 
the same presidency.  Consider another example from the Nixon 
administration.  Beginning in March 1969, President Nixon ordered a major 
air bombing campaign in Cambodia, a significant expansion of the ongoing 
conflict in Vietnam into the territory of a new, previously neutral, country.128  
While the scope of presidential war powers in many respects remains hotly 
contested (and thus, at least in principle, unlikely to produce clear 
anticanonical examples), the practice of potential anticanonical interest here 
is not the introduction of forces but rather the decision to undertake these 
operations without any notification (before or after commencement) to 
Congress.  At the president’s insistence, none of the relevant congressional 
committees were notified that the president had decided to extend the use of 
military force into a third country whose neutrality the United States 
otherwise publicly recognized.129  Indeed, in response to the president’s 
insistence upon secrecy, the Pentagon developed an elaborate “dual 
reporting” system, making it possible for pilots and navigators involved in 
the missions to file reports of fuel and ordinance use but ensuring that even 
the Pentagon’s already secret records would falsely show no indication of 
any bombing runs into Cambodia.130  After one military flight supervisor 
expressed concern about the falsification of records and asked who they were 
meant to keep the information from, he was reportedly told, “the Foreign 
Relations Committee.”131  Apart from quiet, informal conversations with two 
sympathetic senators and three representatives in the summer of 1969,132 
Congress did not find out about the monthslong bombing campaign until July 
1973, when a whistleblower reported it.133 
Unlike constitutional questions surrounding restrictions on presidential 
removal power and the legality of independent counsel schemes, the courts 
have had scant opportunity to opine directly on any putative presidential 
 
 127. See supra Part I.A.2 (defining “norms”). 
 128. WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, SIDESHOW:  KISSINGER, NIXON, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF 
CAMBODIA 19–24 (1979). 
 129. Id. at 28–30. 
 130. Id. at 30. 
 131. See id. at 32, 214. 
 132. See generally SEYMOUR M. HERSH, THE PRICE OF POWER:  KISSINGER IN THE NIXON 
WHITE HOUSE (1983). 
 133. SHAWCROSS, supra note 128, at 287. 
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authority to withhold information about military operations from 
Congress.134  While contemporaneous lawsuits challenged the legality of 
Nixon’s Cambodia operations on the grounds that the president lacked 
constitutional or statutory authorization to use force there, those lawsuits 
were rejected (without reaching the merits) as posing nonjusticiable political 
questions and, in any event, did not separately present questions about 
secrecy or concealment.135  Congress and the executive have with some 
regularity fought over congressional access to executive branch information, 
although there remain no more than a handful of judicial decisions resolving 
those disputes, which have been most commonly addressed through 
interbranch negotiations.136  What cases exist—lower court decisions 
involving various assertions of executive privilege—generally acknowledge 
that a case for executive privilege may be stronger where national security is 
at stake137 but consistently reject the notion of any absolute privilege 
surrounding national security.138  None of these cases—and no decision of 
the Supreme Court on any topic—makes reference to President Nixon’s 
efforts to conceal information about the Cambodia campaign from 
Congress.139 
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“make[] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation”). 
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equally inseparable from the national security, such as the powers to declare war, raise and 
support armed forces . . . .”); Comm. on Judiciary v. McGahn, 415 F. Supp. 3d 148, 214 
(D.D.C. 2019). 
 139. See GARVEY, supra note 136, at 21.  Presidents have stated they will not use executive 
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or unethical conduct in the executive branch.  The Clinton administration announced that “[i]n 
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wrongdoing or criminality on the part of executive officers.” Id.  A significant application of 
this policy came in the Iran-Contra investigations when President Reagan did not assert 
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One might argue that the paucity of judicial engagement on the question 
necessarily makes the Cambodia situation a weak candidate for anticanonical 
status.  Apart from what courts would think about the legality of the 
president’s conduct if presented with the question, there is only the most 
modest basis on which to assess the courts’ view of the constitutional 
relevance of the Cambodian example given only indirect opportunities to 
engage it.  At the same time, if even judicial affirmation may not be enough 
to save a practical example from anticanonical status (as in the detention 
practice underlying Korematsu), surely judicial silence is not enough to 
foreclose the prospect altogether.  The lack of judicial engagement may be 
especially unproblematic when other lines of evidence are available.  In this 
instance, even as the courts lacked occasion to opine directly on the 
administration’s concealment of information from Congress, Congress itself 
was eager to engage. 
By the time the administration confirmed reports of the secret air campaign 
on July 16, 1973,140 many members of Congress and the public were already 
deeply unhappy with the Nixon administration over a combination of the still 
emerging Watergate scandal141 and the United States’s massive, ongoing 
combat operations in Southeast Asia.142  But it was news of the undisclosed 
campaign in Cambodia (beginning more than a year earlier than Congress 
and the public had been told) that triggered the first resolution calling for the 
president’s impeachment.143  Introduced just two weeks after the Cambodia 
revelations, the focus of the proposed article of impeachment was “not the 
bombing itself nor even the secrecy . . . [but] rather[] its concealment from 
the Congress” in violation of Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution.144  The 
resolution would eventually result in a fourth proposed article of 
impeachment against President Nixon in July of the following year, alleging 
that the president had acted in disregard of his duty to “take care that the laws 
 
executive privilege and even made “relevant excerpts” of his personal diaries available to 
congressional investigators. Id. 
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 144. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 308–09 (1974) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 requiring 
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be faithfully executed” by concealing from and lying to Congress about the 
nature of U.S. bombing operations in Cambodia.145  While the House 
Judiciary Committee ultimately voted not to support the fourth article, the 
majority of those voting against it rejected it for reasons unrelated to their 
views of the concealment itself—including, among other things, that the War 
Powers Resolution146 (WPR), subsequently enacted by Congress in 
November 1973, would now serve as a powerful deterrent against any 
president repeating such conduct.147 
Indeed, following the Cambodia revelations, Congress moved remarkably 
quickly to adopt this significant new legislation regulating the president’s 
conduct of both military- and (later) CIA-led covert operations abroad.  
Having spent more than three years by that point debating whether and how 
to restrict the president’s ability to send U.S. troops into hostilities abroad, 
the House of Representatives finally passed its version of the WPR just three 
days after the Cambodia revelations were confirmed.148  The final WPR was 
enacted three months later and included provisions imposing both 
congressional consultation and reporting requirements on the president.149  
While the WPR has been the subject of much criticism, Congress readily 
overrode the president’s initial veto to enact the bill into law, and presidents 
since have submitted close to 200 reports to Congress regarding the 
introduction of further troops into hostilities, or into circumstances where 
hostilities are imminent, as the WPR requires.150  And public support for the 
kind of congressional engagement the WPR requires of the president has 
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remained remarkably consistent since.  As the bipartisan National War 
Powers Commission summarized in its 2018 report:  “Despite changes in 
historical context and the varying nature of external threats, the mood of the 
American public has remained decidedly in favor of consultation prior to 
committing American troops abroad.”151 
Yet if such indicia might support the conclusion that the president’s 
concealment of information about U.S. military operations from Congress 
has earned anticanonical status among actors outside the executive branch—
such that the secrecy surrounding early Cambodia operations today serves as 
practical justification for the maintenance of laws and norms to the opposite 
effect—the evidence for its anticanonical status for executive branch actors 
is more complex.  Conventional wisdom among scholars and policy officials 
remains that the WPR “tends to be honored in the breach rather than by 
observance,”152 in substantial measure because the executive branch has 
remained chronically resistant.153  OLC wrote in 2002 that it has “questioned 
the WPR’s constitutionality on numerous occasions.”154  And presidential 
administrations have not filed WPR reports on several occasions when they 
believed that the introduction of forces under the circumstances did not rise 
to the level of “hostilities” triggering the reporting requirement in article 4 of 
the WPR.155  Even when WPR reports are submitted, as one account has it, 
they are “relegated to lower-level executive personnel” and “stripped of so 
much content in the interest of preserving secrecy as to make them hardly 
useful.”156  In the meantime, because the WPR reporting and consultation 
requirements apply only to the U.S. Armed Forces, presidents initially found 
it possible to avoid its provisions by invoking separate statutory powers to 
pursue covert action through the CIA.157 
Indeed, Nixon’s Cambodia operation was not the last occasion on which 
the executive branch attempted to keep information from Congress about 
U.S. engagements in military conflicts outside the United States.  The Iran-
Contra affair, which emerged publicly in 1986, concerned in part the Reagan 
administration’s secret efforts to sell arms to Iran in exchange for the release 
of American hostages and to use the proceeds of those sales to support the 
military insurgency of the Contra rebels against the Nicaraguan government, 
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in violation of federal law prohibiting U.S. government assistance to the 
group.158  To be sure, the incident was different from Nixon’s Cambodia 
activities in multiple respects.  Among others, the U.S. Armed Forces were 
not themselves engaged in hostilities in Nicaragua, and what support the 
United States did provide largely focused on arming and training the Contra 
rebels and was channeled not through the military but through CIA 
personnel, not covered by the terms of the WPR.159  Yet the dynamic was 
broadly familiar:  the executive, conscious that planned force-related 
activities faced congressional opposition, this time in the form of explicit 
statutory restrictions,160 worked actively to conceal its actions from 
Congress.161 
The conventional case thus features a seemingly damning collection of 
executive efforts to circumvent post-Cambodia congressional notification 
requirements:  questioning the law’s constitutionality, avoiding the broad 
application of legislative restrictions (through narrow exercises in statutory 
interpretation), and on at least one highly visible set of occasions, failing to 
comply with parallel disclosure requirements governing the activities of the 
intelligence community.  But far from undermining the existence of the 
anticanonical norm fostered by the Cambodia precedent—a norm that at its 
core rejects executive branch concealment of use of force operations from 
Congress—there is strong reason to view the positions the executive took in 
each of these instances as in fact having had the practical effect of 
strengthening it. 
Take the position of OLC, which has opined on multiple occasions on the 
constitutionality and application of the WPR since its enactment.162  
Notwithstanding the common assertion that “[e]very President since Ford has 
questioned the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution,”163 only one 
administration since President Nixon’s has expressly taken the position that 
the WPR is in any respect unconstitutional—the George W. Bush 
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administration—and only then with respect to § 5(b) of the WPR (requiring 
the automatic termination of the use of force after sixty days in the absence 
of congressional authorization).164  Not even President Nixon (who famously 
vetoed the bill in part on constitutional grounds before Congress’s override) 
challenged the constitutionality of the WPR’s consultation requirement, 
which he praised as “foster[ing]” the “prudent fulfillment by each branch of 
its constitutional responsibilities . . . by enhancing the flow of information 
from the executive branch to Congress.”165  While OLC has engaged 
vigorously in detailed statutory debates about the timing of consultation and 
the nature of “hostilities” triggering the reporting requirement of the WPR,166 
it has never questioned the facial constitutionality of the consultation or 
reporting requirements—criticisms that surely would have arisen by now had 
they existed.  Put differently, there has been sustained, bipartisan acceptance 
over a period of decades of the constitutionality of the WPR’s reporting 
requirements. 
What then of the multiple executive attempts to avoid filing a formal report 
pursuant to § 4 of the WPR, often based on the executive’s narrow 
understanding of the kind of force that counts as “hostilities” under the 
WPR.167  There is indeed a running list of incidents in which the U.S. Armed 
Forces have been deployed in potentially or actually hostile situations abroad 
(including, for example, a several days long bombing campaign in Iraq in 
1998) in which presidents did not submit WPR reports to Congress.168  It is 
far less evident that the absence of formal reports in these situations had any 
bearing on the (putative) norm of not concealing military operations from 
Congress.  Under the WPR, the filing of the formal report starts the running 
of a sixty-day clock, after which time § 5 requires any use of military force 
to cease unless Congress has authorized its use.169  As noted above, it is this 
cutoff clock provision that is the source of the controversy surrounding the 
WPR on constitutional grounds and otherwise.170  It is, likewise, precisely 
for this reason that such formal reporting failures are best understood as 
avoiding the application of § 5’s cutoff provision, not § 4’s disclosure 
provision.  Indeed, none of the operations typically cited as among those in 
which the executive should have but did not submit a formal report were 
secret, much less actively hidden by the executive branch.171  All were the 
subject of contemporaneous press coverage and moreover, were generally 
affirmatively announced to the public at large through official statements 
 
 164. Auth. of the President Under Domestic and Int’l L. to Use Mil. Force Against Iraq, 26 
Op. O.L.C. 143, 159–60 (2002); see also David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The 
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—a Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 
1072–74 (2008). 
 165. Veto of the War Powers Resolution, 311 PUB. PAPERS 893, 895 (Oct. 24, 1973). 
 166. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 167. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 153, at 49 & n.10 (describing, for example, the “tanker war” 
in the Persian Gulf in the summer of 1988). 
 168. See COLLIER & GRIMMETT, supra note 150, at 95. 
 169. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b). 
 170. See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text. 
 171. See COLLIER & GRIMMETT, supra note 150, at 95. 
2020] THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ANTICANON 631 
issued by the Department of Defense.172  The executive’s behavior in these 
instances fairly reflected avoidance of the application of the § 5 cutoff.  But 
its behavior equally reflected the rejection of executive branch concealment 
of military force—that is, the executive practice supports an understanding 
of Nixon’s active concealment in Cambodia as anticanonical in nature. 
The same surely cannot be said of the Reagan administration’s behavior in 
connection with the Iran-Contra affair.  While the executive’s conduct did 
not implicate the WPR, even then Attorney General Edwin Meese 
acknowledged that the arms sales to Iran should have but did not comply with 
parallel notification laws (also enacted following the Cambodia conflict) 
applicable to the intelligence community.173  But in understanding how this 
series of events bears on the anticanonical status of Nixon’s Cambodia 
behavior—and the accompanying norm against concealment—it is essential 
to recall how norms themselves are defined.  Norms can regulate the behavior 
of public officials, “guiding and constraining how these actors ‘exercise 
political discretion.’”174  But there is no sense in which norms—or for that 
matter, laws—cease to exist in the face of a singular violation.175  Rather, a 
key part of what distinguishes a “norm” from any other form of government 
behavior is that its violation is met with some form of practical (i.e., social, 
political, professional, or bureaucratic) disapproval.176 
In the Iran-Contra affair, the evidence of practical disapproval was 
overwhelming—and especially compelling in light of Reagan’s strong 
popularity otherwise.177  The scandal produced three separate, sweeping 
investigations:  a commission created by the president himself to review what 
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happened,178 an independent counsel investigation to assess criminal 
liability,179 and an investigation by select committees of Congress convened 
to evaluate the course of events and the need for legislative reform.180  The 
independent counsel investigation yielded fourteen criminal indictments, all 
but three resulting in convictions and all involving the underlying conduct 
and subsequent efforts to conceal it.181  The scandal likewise sparked 
renewed legislative efforts to clarify and tighten covert action requirements, 
producing a multiyear set of debates capped by significant revisions to the 
law governing covert action.182  As for the public’s reaction, Gallup tracked 
a staggering 16 percent drop in President Reagan’s job approval rating in the 
weeks following his attorney general’s first public acknowledgment that the 
administration had been secretly using profits from the Iranian arms sales to 
help fund the Contra rebels in Nicaragua.183  Gallup described the shift at the 
time as “the sharpest one-month drop ever recorded by a public opinion poll 
in measuring approval of Presidential job performance.”184  Indeed, the 
monthly poll following the attorney general’s announcement found 79 
percent of Americans disapproving of the Reagan administration’s conduct 
in the matter.185  In the end, the president turned to television, addressing the 
nation directly from the Oval Office about the scandal.186  Far from seeking 
to defend his actions (with reference to past presidential behavior or 
otherwise), President Reagan embraced the critical findings of the Tower 
Commission report, accepted its recommendations, and regretfully took full 
responsibility for the administration’s conduct.187 
In addition to reinforcing the previous conclusion about the effect of 
judicial silence not foreclosing the prospect of anticanonical status, this 
example suggests several amendments to the criteria established so far for 
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[https://perma.cc/K8KT-BYG5]. 
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evaluating anticanonical status.  Most notably, anticanonical status may exist 
even if the executive has repeated the anticanonical practice.  While one 
would expect anticanonical norms to have some constraining effect on 
subsequent executive branch practice, one would no more suspect legal 
norms of securing perfect compliance than one would expect as much from 
norm-based laws (like murder).188  As the definition of norms embraced 
above suggests,189 what matters in both instances is whether any apparent 
variance from the norm produces or can be anticipated to produce negative 
practical consequences of some kind for future presidents.  Here, the 
executive was at pains to explain even technical variances in terms of the 
(nonconcealment) norm (as in its detailed explanations for not filing reports 
under article 4 of the WPR) and suffered significant negative consequences 
when it was violated without explanation (as in efforts to mask Iran-Contra 
from Congress).  Indeed, repetition coupled with a negative reaction—most 
especially against an otherwise popular president—may, in this sense, prove 
to be stronger evidence of anticanonical status than nonrepetition from which 
disfavor can only be inferred. 
Which brings us back to the Korematsu internment practice introduced at 
the outset, a seemingly anticanonical incident that President Trump invoked 
favorably during his campaign.190  Not only did candidate Trump campaign 
and win the election on a platform advocating the mass exclusion of a suspect 
class of individuals from the United States on ostensible national security 
grounds,191 he issued a series of orders as president aimed at carrying such 
an exclusion into effect—the third version of which was ultimately upheld 
by the Supreme Court.192  True, the Trump travel ban orders were aimed not 
at U.S. citizens but at noncitizens, discriminated not on the basis of race but 
of religion, and significantly involved not detention but denial of 
admission.193  But it was President Trump himself who thought the parallel 
sufficient.  Have these actions now compromised the anticanonical status of 
the presidential practice—or, put differently, weakened the especially 
compelling character of the norm?  While the fate of travel ban policies, and 
the Trump presidency more broadly, is yet to unfold, there are reasons to look 
at the systemic response to the initial travel ban order as importantly norm 
reinforcing.  In the face of massive public protests and aggressive litigation, 
the travel ban in its original form was struck down quickly and repeatedly by 
the lower courts, and the executive moved to revise it in important ways 
(among others, by clarifying that those with long-standing residence in the 
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United States would not be affected) before producing a version of the order 
finally upheld by the Court.194  Indeed, the Court took the occasion of 
affirming a revised version of the policy to conclude that the Korematsu 
decision that candidate Trump had invoked was itself no longer good law.  
The systemic response to these actions is still unfolding.  But it would be a 
mistake to ignore those indications that already exist that President Trump’s 
use has had, at least in part, a norm-reinforcing effect. 
C.  Conducting Sustained Military Ground Operations Without 
Congressional Authorization 
The discussion of the Cambodia example began by hypothesizing that 
ongoing contestation surrounding the president’s authority to use force 
absent congressional authorization made presidential use-of-force practices 
an unlikely area in which to find even plausible candidates for anticanonical 
status.  Much constitutional law on the topic remains unsettled.  Indeed, “few 
areas of American constitutional law engender more fierce debate.”195  At 
the same time, the Korean War was and remains an unprecedented, and 
unrepeated, assertion of presidential authority to go to war without 
congressional authorization.  Nearly 1.8 million American troops were 
deployed to the Korean theater between 1950 and1953 in a conflict involving 
air, sea, and ground combat that left more than 36,000 American soldiers 
dead and more than one hundred thousand wounded.196  In the seventy years 
since, in every U.S. war of comparable scope (in the introduction of ground 
troops, duration, or loss of life), presidents have sought and received some 
form of express congressional authorization.197  Since the Korean War, OLC 
has repeatedly taken the position that the president’s constitutional authority 
to use force without prior authorization excludes operations “sufficiently 
extensive in ‘nature, scope, and duration’” that they rise to the level of “war 
in a constitutional sense.”198  Notwithstanding conventional wisdom, which 
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treats President Truman’s decision to commit combat forces to Korea as but 
one example in a lengthy catalog of practice in which executives have used 
force without prior authorization,199 could it be that Truman’s example—an 
example of no small significance in ongoing debates about executive 
power—now has anticanonical status?  The question turns out to be 
remarkably close. 
The judicial record here is perhaps more instructive, and more 
condemnatory, than elsewhere.  There is no reported case opining directly on 
the constitutionality of President Truman’s commitment of troops in Korea.  
Indeed, unlike in Vietnam and later conflicts, there appears to be no reported 
case even involving a constitutional challenge to the president’s use of force 
in Korea on this point.  At the same time, the Supreme Court came closer 
here to signaling its disapproval of the president’s action than it did on the 
matter of the Cambodian nondisclosure.  In Steel Seizure, the government 
had offered as evidence of the capaciousness of the president’s war powers 
the practical example of the massive deployment of troops to Korea, “sent to 
the field by an exercise of the President’s constitutional powers” alone.200  
Justice Robert Jackson did not “find it necessary or appropriate to consider 
the legal status of the Korean enterprise to discountenance,”201 as he did, the 
government’s argument that the president’s commander-in-chief authority 
included the power to seize and operate steel mills domestically.202  But 
Justice Jackson’s decision to focus on the president’s lack of domestic 
powers came only after his cautionary assessment:  “Nothing in our 
Constitution is plainer than that declaration of a war is entrusted only to 
Congress.”203  Indeed, the Steel Seizure majority’s rejection of the notion that 
Truman’s practice in Korea might now inform the meaning of Article II is 
made particularly plain in context; the sole instance in which a reported 
judicial opinion cites President Truman’s practice in support of presidential 
power is in the Steel Seizure dissent.204 
President Truman’s action to repel North Korean forces following their 
surprise invasion of the South was met at first with overwhelming popular 
support both in Congress and in the general public.205  But opinion on the 
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action quickly soured among both over time as the war effort struggled.206  
While it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to untangle fully the varied reasons 
why the Korean War became so unpopular, at least part of the opposition in 
Congress plainly centered on doubts about the president’s constitutional 
authority.  Prominent Republican Senator Robert Taft was among the first to 
call into question the adequacy of the president’s authority to proceed in 
Korea, a concern that took root as it became clear combat would continue 
beyond America’s emergency action to repel the invasion from the North.207  
As even OLC would later recognize, President Truman’s action in Korea—
with the authorization of the United Nations (UN) Security Council but 
“without prior approval of, or subsequent ratification by, Congress”—
centrally informed the so-called “Great Debate” of 1951 over whether the 
United States should commit troops to Europe pursuant to the newly formed 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).208  In the end, the Senate voted 
to support the NATO deployment but only after voting overwhelmingly for 
an amendment emphasizing that no further ground forces would be sent to 
Europe in implementation of the treaty without “further congressional 
approval.”209  Over time, Senator Taft’s doubts about the adequacy of the 
president’s legal authority gained traction.210  The 1952 Republican Party 
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platform singled out as among the failures of the Truman administration the 
decision to “plung[e] us into war in Korea without the consent of our citizens 
through their authorized representatives in the Congress.”211  By 1973, 
Korea, along with Vietnam, had become a poster child in Congress for 
advocates of the WPR.  As one member put it: 
As the result of our country’s experience in Korea and Vietnam, one lesson 
should be clear by now to everyone:  Congress must play its rightful role in 
warmaking—not only to satisfy the demands of the Constitution—but also 
for the practical reason of creating the national unity and purpose which are 
necessary for the success of our national effort.212 
The growth of misgivings over time about President Truman’s lack of 
congressional authorization might in part explain the consistency of 
executive branch practice since.  While presidents have used force in various 
ways without congressional authorization many times since Korea, every 
conflict involving a significant commitment of U.S. ground troops or U.S. 
casualties since has had some form of express congressional authorization.213  
And while presidents since have spoken with varying degrees of praise of the 
policy wisdom of “Truman’s War” in Korea, I have not unearthed any 
instance in which a president since has publicly invoked President Truman’s 
example in defense of his own decision to use force without congressional 
authorization elsewhere.214  Indeed, even when faced with a legal situation 
identical to the one that faced Truman—having won UN Security Council 
authorization but not the approval of Congress for the use of force in Libya 
in 2011—neither President Obama nor the Obama administration’s OLC 
invoked the Korea example in support of the proposition that the president 
has the power to act without congressional authorization, a proposition OLC 
limited to the use of force, as anticipated in Libya, less than “war in a 
constitutional sense.”215 
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Yet it is, perhaps ironically and certainly instructively, OLC’s writings that 
provide the most important evidence against the conclusion that the Korean 
War is now anticanonical practice.  In one sense, that evidence is fairly thin.  
While OLC war powers opinions generally rely heavily on past examples of 
presidential practice in support of OLC’s understanding of the president’s 
constitutional power, reliance on the Korea example has been remarkably 
limited.  Of more than a dozen publicly available OLC memoranda 
addressing presidential war authority since President Truman, the vast 
majority of mentions of Korea are for the purpose of supporting limited and 
largely uncontroversial propositions.  OLC has occasionally noted the Korea 
action, for instance, in support of the proposition that protecting the 
credibility of the UN has been an important national interest of the United 
States.216  A 1980 OLC opinion was the first to suggest that Korea might 
serve as precedent “for the commitment of United States armed forces, 
without prior congressional approval or declaration of war, to aid an ally in 
repelling an armed invasion,” although that suggestion is immediately 
followed by the caveat that “clearly such a response cannot be sustained over 
time without the acquiescence, indeed the approval, of Congress.”217 
Although OLC’s references to the Korea example may be limited, two 
such references do require closer examination.  First, in a 2002 George W. 
Bush administration OLC opinion signed by Assistant Attorney General Jay 
Bybee, OLC for the first time cited Korea in unmodified support of the 
practical proposition that “[p]residents have long undertaken military actions 
pursuant to their constitutional authority as Chief Executive and Commander 
in Chief . . . [in] numerous unilateral exercises of military force.”218  On its 
face, this single-sentence reference to the conflict in support of an otherwise 
unremarkable, general proposition seems something less than a major shift 
in the conflict’s precedential value in the executive branch.  Indeed, the 2002 
memorandum was submitted after President George W. Bush had already 
secured congressional authorization for the 2003 Iraq War, making the 
memorandum’s position on the sweeping scope of presidential authority in 
the absence of congressional authorization (up to and including force 
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necessary to secure “regime change”) the equivalent of legal dicta.219  
Neither was the George W. Bush administration keen to publicly press its 
reading of presidential power in this realm; despite congressional efforts to 
obtain the 2002 memorandum,220 it was not revealed until 2009, upon release 
by the Obama administration’s Justice Department.221  The Obama Justice 
Department did not include the 2002 memorandum among the nearly dozen 
OLC memoranda it withdrew during that period as “not consistent with the 
current views of OLC,”222 a highly unusual move for any OLC.  However, 
its subsequent 2011 OLC opinion on the president’s power to use force in 
Libya returns to the previously articulated limitation on the president’s 
power:  the force that the president undertakes alone must be something less 
than force of the duration and scope that would amount to “war in the 
constitutional sense.”223  Likewise, while the Trump administration’s OLC 
memorandum on the use of force in Syria again mentions Korea in a list of 
historical instances in which presidents have used force without 
congressional authorization, it too plainly and repeatedly embraces the post-
Korea standard:  unilateral uses of force by the president going forward must 
amount to something less than “war in the constitutional sense.”224  These 
memoranda mention Korea but do not seem to rely on it in its relevant sense; 
and the presidential practice that follows each is inconsistent with the practice 
Truman pursued. 
A second type of OLC reference is more problematic.  OLC has twice 
(under President Nixon in 1970 and under President Clinton in 2000) 
referenced Korea in support of some version of the proposition that 
congressional appropriations following a president’s decision to deploy 
troops into (otherwise unauthorized) hostilities might be taken as evidence of 
congressional acquiescence to (or even authorization of) the use of force in 
some circumstances.225  This use is potentially problematic in two respects:  
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(1) it suggests that, notwithstanding the various ways in which Congress and 
the public expressed their disapproval of President Truman’s action in Korea 
noted above, Congress itself subsequently ratified President Truman’s 
actions; and (2) it suggests that the executive branch has at least on occasion 
relied on the Korea precedent to establish a positive executive branch norm 
(i.e., presidents can use even Korea-level force without prior authorization so 
long as Congress continues to appropriate funds for deployed troops)—a use 
that would seem to take Korea out of the running for anticanonical status. 
The first inference from OLC’s reliance on Korea in this respect—that 
Congress itself subsequently accepted the president’s actions in Korea as 
constitutional—is more easily dismissed.  Both OLC memoranda, as well the 
underlying scholarly sources that comprise the principal basis on which the 
memoranda support their proposition of congressional authorization or 
acquiescence, take pains to recognize that Congress’s post-Korea legislation 
may not actually have sufficed to establish either.  The sole authorities on 
which the 1970 OLC memorandum relies in support of its passing assertion 
of congressional acquiescence to Korea include no reference to legislation at 
all but rather two popular histories—neither one of which discusses, much 
less supports, the proposition that Congress acquiesced to President 
Truman’s action.226  The 2000 OLC memorandum likewise mentions Korea 
in a single sentence, noting that “[i]t has also been argued that Congress 
ratified the Korean War by enacting several major pieces of war-related 
legislation during that conflict, including a bill to increase taxes by $4.7 
billion to help pay for the war.”227  The memorandum itself does not 
embrace, much less make, this argument.  Instead, it cites solely to work by 
legal scholar John Hart Ely, who also notes the existence of the argument 
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internal U.S. political debates, it is on the political and strategic imperatives of Korean 
intervention.  There is scant discussion of constitutional considerations at all, save to the extent 
Rees recognizes that President Truman’s decision not to seek congressional authorization 
would become a vigorous point of attack by domestic opposition (which eventually hands 
President Truman a crushing defeat in 1952). DAVID REES, KOREA:  THE LIMITED WAR 26, 
400–01 (1964). 
 227. See Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kos., 24 Op. O.L.C. 327, 334–35 
(2000). 
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without embracing it and indeed, while expressing skepticism of it.228  To 
the extent anyone actually argued Congress had approved the war in Korea, 
it appears traceable to a 1974 article by two political scientists who cite 
several 1950 enactments, including bills:  extending the draft and lifting the 
ceiling on the size of the armed forces, making various economic adjustments 
to prevent inflation in response to anticipated increased defense production, 
granting foreign aid to various countries in Asia, and increasing taxes.229  
None of the bills in any way authorized the use of military force in Korea (or 
elsewhere), and as the 2000 OLC memorandum itself made clear, no such 
authorization can be properly inferred unless the legislation “clearly 
intend[s]” to grant “specific authorization.”230  As to whether the statutes can 
be understood as acquiescence to President Truman’s decision to launch a 
war without congressional authorization, that case is likewise difficult to 
sustain.  For one thing, all of the legislation cited to support the theory of 
congressional acquiescence to the Korean War was enacted within the first 
three months of the military’s deployment,231 reflecting, at most, Congress’s 
initial support for what members might have expected would be a short-term 
engagement.232  Particularly with the subsequent enactment of the WPR, in 
express response to the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, it seems hard to 
credit the notion that the legislation stands for congressional acquiescence to 
waging a sustained ground war without authorization. 
The second inference from OLC’s usage—that Korea supports an 
affirmative executive branch norm regarding the use of force—is more 
problematic.  Could an executive branch legal opinion suggesting that a 
president could do what Truman did in Korea—an opinion no president has 
ever acted on and that the Court has implicitly rejected—really save from 
anticanonical status a precedent that has been in all other ways practically 
condemned?  The prospect that a practical precedent could be invoked by the 
courts seems rather a slim basis on which to save it from at least current 
precedential ignominy; any institutional actor could, in theory, rely on any 
otherwise disfavored practice at any time.233  The mere prospect that even 
long disfavored practices might someday be resurrected seems hardly 
sufficient to overcome their status as currently disfavored. 
 
 228. ELY, supra note 153, at 11 & nn.66–67. 
 229. Larry Elowitz & John Spanier, Korea and Vietnam:  Limited War and the American 
Political System, 18 ORBIS 510, 517 n.11 (1974–75). 
 230. See Continuing Hostilities in Kos., 24 Op. O.L.C. at 346; accord 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a) 
(providing that war authority “shall not be inferred . . . from any provision of law . . . unless 
such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into 
hostilities”). 
 231. See, e.g., The Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 4501–4568). 
 232. I say “at most” because some of the legislation, like the foreign aid bill, is equally 
consistent with a congressional view that supports monetary aid to South Korea to enable it to 
repel the North’s invasion itself. 
 233. Cf. Alex Thompson, Progressive Activists Push 2020 Dems to Pack Supreme Court, 
POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2019, 9:11 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/25/ 
progressive-activists-pack-supreme-court-1182792 [https://perma.cc/LRT7-24CT]. 
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At the same time, OLC’s willingness to invoke the example suggests that 
one would be relying on Korea’s anticanonical status at peril—that is, it 
would be a mistake to assume that no court would ever rely on it as evidence 
of constitutional meaning or that President Truman’s action is so generally 
recognized as mistaken that it is has come to set a standard for what the 
executive branch should not do.  Many former OLC attorneys later make 
their ways to the federal bench; indeed, the 1970 memorandum was authored 
by former Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the 2002 memorandum was 
authored by now Ninth Circuit Judge Jay Bybee.234  While courts rarely 
decide cases involving the president’s power to use force abroad, Korea 
seems unlikely to be off the table entirely as practical evidence in, for 
example, Judge Bybee’s court if they do.  Moreover, OLC’s use may reflect 
the pervasiveness of a normative understanding of presidential power that 
exists outside the executive branch—a conventional view of an “imperial 
presidency” advanced by legal scholars and political scientists in popular and 
scholarly settings alike, according to which Korea is just one in a long, 
undifferentiated list of incidents in which presidents “have regularly 
breached constitutional principles,” using military force whether or not 
Congress approves.235  Such an understanding would not be so surprising.  
Presidentialist legal scholars and lawyers in particular have looked to 
presidential practice in isolation from systemic response, in service not only 
of normative understandings of presidentialness but also in advancing 
affirmative commitments to maximizing presidential power.236 
The Korea example—while likely not presently part of an executive 
branch anticanon as this Article has defined it—thus adds to our 
understanding of anticanonical status in several important ways.  First, even 
if executive branch practice does not support a norm of presidential 
behavior—indeed, even if executive branch practice would support the 
opposite norm of presidential behavior—it is possible that normative 
expectations of presidential practice from outside the executive branch may 
be enough to preserve a practice’s precedential effect.  In one sense, this 
might be considered a desirable effect, just the way a system of popular 
constitutionalism is meant to function.237  In another sense, this effect tends 
 
 234. Auth. of the President Under Domestic and Int’l L. to Use Mil. Force Against Iraq, 26 
Op. O.L.C. 143 (2002); Presidential Auth. to Permit Incursion into Communist Sanctuaries in 
the Cambodia-Viet. Border Area, 1 Supp. Op. O.L.C. 313 (1970). 
 235. For a discussion of the parameters of this conventional case, see, for example, Deborah 
Pearlstein, Getting Past the Imperial Presidency, 10 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 368, 373 (2019) 
(citing ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973)); see also Kevin M. Kruse 
& Julian E. Zelizer, Have We Had Enough of the Imperial Presidency Yet?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/09/opinion/president-trump-border-wall-
weak.html [https://perma.cc/JJ48-3RLK]. 
 236. Scholarly proponents of broad executive power commonly note President Lincoln’s 
suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War as evidence of broad presidential power 
without noting the Court’s subsequent rejection of President Lincoln’s assertion of power in 
this respect or the absence of any repetition of the practice by subsequent presidents. See 
generally DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 157–59 (2003) (describing this episode). 
 237. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
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to undermine the justification for relying on practice as a guide to 
interpretation—a justification based on the notion that practice reflects 
practical settlement among the political branches of government.  The near 
seventy-year-old practical settlement between the political branches would 
make this a relatively clear anticanonical case.  But in assessing the 
normative impact of presidential practice, apparent intrabranch settlement is 
not all that matters.  In all events, the example points those who might be 
concerned about the scope of presidential war power to a clearer 
understanding of the stability, or not, of what normative agreement might be 
said to exist. 
III.  UTILITY OF A PRACTICAL ANTICANON 
Whether or not one believes the particular foregoing instances warrant 
inclusion in the pantheon of executive branch black sheep, these examples 
serve, at least, to illustrate how one might go about determining whether a 
practice has attained (or sunken to) anticanonical status.  The foregoing 
analysis suggests at least the following conclusions.  First, even if a particular 
executive practice was not formally rejected by Congress or the courts in real 
time, anticanonical practice will produce a substantial public record (in 
hearings, speeches, or other public actions) of disfavor by governing 
institutions over time, as well as sustained rejection by the public.  Second, 
while it is certainly possible to identify anticanonical practices that have not 
since been repeated (like President Nixon’s Saturday Night Massacre), 
nonrepetition of the practice as such cannot be considered dispositive.238  For 
one thing, plenty of historically favored actions have never been repeated 
(the Emancipation Proclamation, for example) but for reasons that have far 
more to do with circumstance and opportunity than with negative perception.  
More importantly, no law or legal norm, no matter how deeply engrained, 
enjoys 100 percent compliance; one might expect eventual repetition of even 
bad behavior as part of the “fact of violation” associated with norm-driven 
behavior.239  What matters far more is the institutional response to any 
repetition of anticanonical practice.  Repetition, when coupled with renewed 
condemnation (as in the Iran-Contra affair), should be understood as 
evidence of the vitality of a practice’s anticanonical status, not its demise.  
Finally, even if a practice has been rejected in some measure by all three 
branches, it may still not belong in an anticanon of executive practice if there 
is evidence that the practice is relied on as affirmative support for presidential 
action.  For while the universe of presidential practice is too vast and the 
bandwidth of contemporary institutions too narrow to fairly expect each 
practice to receive some up or down vote of approval, affirmative reliance on 
the example undermines any assumption that it stands for a shared 
understanding that can reliably be expected to guide present governance. 
 
 238. See supra Part II.B (discussing President Trump’s allusions to Korematsu in support 
of a “travel ban”). 
 239. HART, supra note 175, at 81, 92–94 (describing how legal systems handle “the fact of 
violation”). 
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How, then, might these conclusions inform our understanding of 
presidential precedent going forward?  This part suggests the exercise of 
sketching an executive branch anticanon may be useful in at least three ways:  
(1) guiding the use of practice in constitutional interpretation, (2) clarifying 
the scope and robustness of assumed norms, and (3) identifying institutional 
pathways for guarding against undesirable norm formation.  To illustrate 
these functions, this part considers how the examples above might help to 
shed light on analogous current debates surrounding assertions of 
presidential power. 
A.  Constitutional Interpretation 
While the Saturday Night Massacre itself was never subject to judicial 
scrutiny, the example provides perhaps the most direct insight among those 
discussed here into whether and how anticanonical practice should be used 
to guide constitutional interpretation.  For notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Morrison to uphold the independent counsel statute 
against a separation of powers challenge,240 the constitutionality of that law, 
including its imposition of restrictions on the president’s ability to remove an 
investigative counsel, has remained the subject of intense constitutional 
debate,241 particularly on the import of interbranch practice on this question.  
Indeed, then Judge Brett Kavanaugh, among others, has argued that 
Congress’s decision to allow the original independent counsel statute to lapse 
following the Starr investigation reflected the branches’ recognition that the 
burden on the presidency of such a counsel was too great to be continued.242  
It is an argument that takes from institutional inaction on this singular 
executive restriction a lesson of collective disapproval. 
Yet the anticanonical status of the presidential practice described above—
based on a record that tracks bipartisan institutional and public response over 
time—would suggest just the opposite conclusion.  That is, there is not only 
a shared but robust recognition among the branches and the public that 
 
 240. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (addressing 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–
599 (1994)). 
 241. See generally Symposium, The Independent Counsel Act:  From Watergate to 
Whitewater and Beyond, 86 GEO. L.J. 2011 (1998) (featuring contributions by Michael R. 
Bromwich, George D. Brown, Arthur H. Christy, Samuel Dash, Joseph E. diGenova, Katy J. 
Harriger, Philip B. Heymann, Brett Kavanaugh, Norman J. Ornstein, Julie R. O’Sullivan, 
Jerome J. Shestack, Donald C. Smaltz, Cass R. Sunstein, and Lawrence E. Walsh). 
 242. See, e.g., Brett M. Kavanaugh, Separation of Powers During the Forty-Fourth 
Presidency and Beyond, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1454, 1462 n.36 (2009) (“I believe that the 
independent counsel statute was a major mistake for reasons I have articulated previously.  
Congress itself came to that conclusion in 1999 when it declined to reauthorize the statute.” 
(citations omitted)); Id. (“The [independent counsel] law is dying because there appears to be 
a consensus that it created more problems than it solved.” (quoting 145 CONG. REC. S7766 
(daily ed. June 29, 1999) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter))).  Judge Kenneth Starr himself 
has made this same point. See The Future of the Independent Counsel Act:  Hearings Before 
the S. Comm. on Governmental Affs., 106th Cong. 425–34 (1999) (statement of Kenneth W. 
Starr, Independent Counsel). 
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presidents should not be able to fire counsel investigating them.243  Congress 
may have abandoned the particular investigative approach set forth in the 
independent counsel statute, but there is nothing that suggests it did so 
because it believes presidents should be able to fire their investigators244 and 
significant evidence of mutual agreement among the branches to the opposite 
effect.245 
The lessons here, then, are twofold.  First, sensible reliance on practice as 
evidence of constitutional meaning requires accounting for the range of 
constituencies that help determine whether and how presidential “precedent” 
is made and for the reality that those constituencies’ expressions of interest 
may be most reliably assessed by observing the exchange of institutional 
responses over time.  Second, and correspondingly, identifying a practice as 
anticanonical in the sense discussed here does not mean the courts should 
henceforth ignore its effect on constitutional meaning.  Quite to the contrary, 
in evaluating the constitutionality of future potential mechanisms designed 
to limit a president’s ability to forestall investigations into his own conduct, 
the anticanonical status of the Saturday Night Massacre should be powerful 
evidence of a presidential behavior that has no practical or normative 
support—and no precedential effect.  Nixon’s Saturday Night Massacre was 
and has remained understood as unacceptable presidential behavior. 
B.  Norm Clarification 
How confident can scholars and policymakers be in identifying which 
norms of constitutional governance go without saying and which may need 
codification or other formal reinforcement?  While President Trump’s strike 
against Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani246 and his troubling threats 
of “fire and fury . . . the likes of which the world has never seen” in response 
to North Korean nuclear posturing have been among many events prompting 
renewed interest in the adequacy of constitutional constraints on presidential 
war power,247 the conclusion above that Korea may not be anticanonical in 
nature suggests that scholarly confidence about the adequacy of constraints 
may be misplaced.  At the height of recent crises, several scholars argued that 
the relevant constitutional law of presidential power is clear, and the answer 
to whether the president could start a war with Korea or Iran without 
 
 243. Among the findings noted above, presidential practice itself since Nixon has reflected 
a strong norm against firing investigative counsel, and the attempt to do so has been met with 
significant forms of sanction. 
 244. See 145 CONG. REC. S7766–90 (daily ed. June 29, 1999). 
 245. See supra note 242. 
 246. Michael Crowley et al., U.S. Strike in Iraq Kills Qassim Suleimani, Commander of 
Iranian Forces, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/ 
middleeast/qassem-soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html [https://perma.cc/5RRP-UR94]. 
 247. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Choe Sang-Hun, Trump Threatens ‘Fire and Fury’ Against 
North Korea If It Endangers U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/08/08/world/asia/north-korea-un-sanctions-nuclear-missile-united-nations.html [https:// 
perma.cc/7GFN-N9TT]. 
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Congress’s authorization was negative.248  OLC memoranda have 
consistently excepted “‘war’ in the constitutional sense” from the suite of 
unilateral presidential authorities, and given the strategic reality in Korea, 
any U.S. attack there could only be understood as carrying a significant risk 
of being a “war” in the constitutional sense.249  Indeed, bipartisan majorities 
of both the Democratic-controlled House and Republican-controlled Senate 
passed legislation reiterating the necessity for the president to win 
congressional authorization before pursuing further hostilities with Iran.250 
Yet while there is indeed significant basis for reading many OLC opinions 
to recognize that standard—a standard that would be consistent with the 
anticanonical nature of President Truman’s action in Korea—the analysis 
above suggests the example falls short of that status.  Indeed, the precedential 
import of the Korea example is subject to contestation in a way that may be 
particularly likely to influence present practice.  Both because legal and 
policy officials may come into the executive branch with strong views and 
affirmative agendas about the scope of presidential power and because 
popular and even scholarly understandings about the import of Korea in the 
history of presidential practice does not align with what executive branch 
practice has actually been, any legal norm against presidents starting full-
blown wars cannot be understood to “go without saying.”  Especially where 
the constitutional law of executive power is obscure or unsettled, decision 
makers’ instincts about what may be done may play an outsized role in 
establishing the scope of reasonable policy debate.  With those instincts 
shaped at least in the first instance by conventional accounts, it is entirely 
possible that knowing “presidents have done this” makes more likely the 
assumption that “presidents can do this” will be sustained. 
In addition to teaching that those worried about executive war power 
would be wise to add the “no war in the constitutional sense without 
Congress” understanding to the list of norms needing formal reinforcement, 
the Korea example also illustrates how efforts to identify anticanonical 
practice can help correct misimpressions about the historical record.  There 
is little doubt that the presence or absence of presidential precedent can help 
establish that some conduct is out of bounds.251  The practical proposition 
that “no President has ever called the press the enemy of the people,”252 for 
 
 248. See, e.g., Marty Lederman, No, the President Cannot Strike North Korea Without 
Congressional Approval, JUST SEC. (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/44056/no-
president-strike-north-korea-congressional-approval [https://perma.cc/67B7-HXFZ]. 
 249. See, e.g., id. 
 250. Catie Edmondson, House Sends Trump Bill to Restrict War Powers on Iran, Setting 
Up Veto, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/us/politics/ 
trump-iran-war-powers-congress.html [https://perma.cc/S4HL-VNFQ]. 
 251. Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 25, at 1433–34 (defining norms as a body of common 
understandings, lacking formal status as law, that nonetheless have the effect of “regulat[ing] 
the public behavior of actors who wield high-level governmental authority, thereby guiding 
and constraining how these actors ‘exercise political discretion’” (quoting Whittington, supra 
note 48, at 1860)). 
 252.  See Emily Stewart, Trump Calls Media the “True Enemy of the People” the Same 
Day a Bomb Is Sent to CNN, VOX (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
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instance, can be used to help support the conclusion there are norms that 
presidents should not call the press the “enemy of the people.”  Practice-
based norms can likewise help establish that some conduct is acceptable.  The 
practical proposition that “presidents regularly use force without consulting 
Congress” can help support the conclusion that presidents can and perhaps 
should use force without consulting Congress.  But it is easy to imagine 
circumstances in which the public’s and even public officials’ perceptions 
about historical practice are less than wholly accurate.253  Even among the 
most well-informed public officials, organization theory provides reason to 
worry that other incentives may skew perceptions about and invocations of 
historical practice.254  Whatever the source of error, mischaracterizations of 
underlying practice can lead to the embrace of actions that are not aligned 
either with actual practice or, given norms’ self-sustaining nature, present 
day preferences.  Like all exercises in historical analysis, investigations into 
anticanonical status can help drive decision makers to embrace courses of 
action more reflective of long-standing, shared beliefs. 
C.  Norm Correction 
Finally, charting past routes from presidential practice to anticanonical 
status may offer something of a road map for how institutions can effectively 
forestall emergent presidential precedent from crystallizing.  Consider in this 
context the Trump administration’s sweeping—regularly called 
unprecedented—refusals to disclose information to Congress, whether in 
connection with impeachment proceedings or other investigations,255 in 
reporting the status of sanctions measures or the expenditure of 
appropriations,256 or in favoring partisan notification only for activities like 
the attack against ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi or operations in 
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approaches to overcome them, from impeachment proceedings to litigation, 
to political campaigns and elections.  Concern about the creation of 
presidential precedent (in one direction or another) has been at the heart of 
the intense focus on the success or failure of these measures.258 
Yet while Nixon’s efforts to conceal information from Congress about his 
secret bombing campaign in Cambodia were successful in real time—the 
campaign was unknown to Congress or the public for nearly four years after 
its commencement—the practice was ultimately denied precedential effect 
(and achieved anticanonical status) through a range of actors’ collective 
response, including:  legislation codifying disclosure requirements to the 
opposite effect, renewed public and official condemnation of analogous 
conduct following repetition, and bipartisan internalization of the opposite 
norm by officials within the executive branch.  Whatever the resolution of 
disclosure conflicts involving the current president, those concerned about 
correcting perceived violations of norms of cooperation and disclosure 
between branches would be wise to pursue a similarly multidimensional 
approach:  enacting structural legislation to clarify and reinforce 
congressional prerogatives or develop novel mechanisms for prompt 
resolution of interbranch disputes; designing internal executive branch 
regulations that reinforce and leverage existing, quasi-independent actors 
such as inspectors general to reinforce disclosure requirements; and pursuing 
ways through popular, legal, educational, and policy-oriented writing to 
illustrate the abnormality of each disfavored example.  As the Korematsu 
example illustrates, the battle for presidential precedent can take decades to 
unfold.  But it is most effectively fought across multiple constituencies in 
American political life. 
CONCLUSION 
By virtue of the norms of the system in which courts operate, judicial 
decisions are commonly recognized as “precedent” the moment they are 
handed down.  This Article has aimed to illustrate how the precedential status 
of presidential behavior is “not fixed but fluctuate[s],”259 depending on the 
judgment over time of the full range of constituencies prepared—or not—to 
give it effect.  The existence of an executive branch anticanon demonstrates 
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the importance of reading presidential practice—whether for purposes of 
constitutional interpretation or otherwise—not as a fixed reality of 
constitutional life but as a barometer of the present status of constitutional 
meaning and norms. 
As noted at the outset, the questions this Article has aimed to answer are 
an attempt to define, describe, and to an extent, justify mapping such an 
anticanon’s existence—the better to understand whether and how an 
executive branch anticanon might come into being.  It remains for future 
scholars to examine why the anticanonical status of some practices—like the 
Saturday Night Massacre or President Nixon’s later decision to comply with 
the Supreme Court’s order to disclose inculpatory tapes—has thus far 
remained relatively robust, while that of others—like the recognition of 
congressional entitlement to executive branch information—are more readily 
subject to renewed challenge.  Perhaps the difference is historical 
happenstance.  Perhaps there are thematic commonalities among more 
durable norms, like the relative cultural pervasiveness of the terms in which 
the practice is understood.  Answering these questions will require 
considering both a broader range and developing a deeper account of historic 
examples.  For present purposes, we must continue to guard against the 
temptation to mistake particular constitutional follies for permanent 
constitutional truth. 
The end of the current presidential administration, whenever it comes, will 
bring with it an opportunity for significant reassessment—for reconstructing 
those aspects of our constitutional government that have proven most 
vulnerable to abuse.  If the anticanon teaches us anything, it is that it would 
be a mistake to view the task of reconstruction as limited to questions of 
executive power alone.  The anticanon is populated by examples of 
presidential behavior to which multiple institutions publicly objected.  
Congress took disciplinary action or (more commonly) enacted contrary 
legislation; subsequent administrations of both parties internalized contrary 
norms; and, just as important, the anticanonical practice was represented 
critically in public education, professional training, political discourse, and 
popular art—in the cultural landmarks defining civic life that all American 
officials encounter well before they enter public service.  Judicial precedents 
may be born.  But presidential precedents are made. 
